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BANKING ON DEMOCRACY
The financial system is unequal and exclusionary even as it is supported, funded, and subsidized by public institutions.
This is not just a flaw in the financial sector; it is a foundational problem for democracy. Across the financial industry,
entrepreneurs, regulators, media, and scholars promote the goal of “financial inclusion” or “access to credit.”
Facebook’s Libra, Bitcoin, and fintech providers like Square, PayPal, Venmo and thousands of other new products or
startup companies are launched with the stated aim of increasing financial inclusion. These private companies are
joined by the Congress, non-profits, and financial regulators with programs and laws promoting financial inclusion. In
fact, financial inclusion and access to credit are among the increasingly rare issues that unite the political left and right.
Yet despite consensus and years of effort, many individuals and communities continue to be excluded from the
mainstream financial system, which forces them to resort to high cost payday lenders, check cashers or other fee-based
financial transaction products. The financially disenfranchised pay the most for services that the wealthy and the middle
class receive at a subsidized rate. This article proposes a new model of financial inclusion, which situates issues of access
and inclusion as central to the legal design of the financial system. This article argues that these remedies have failed
because the current model of financial inclusion is rooted in a mistaken and incomplete theory of the financial market.
Inclusion and “access to credit” are viewed as ancillary product, gap-filling, or a subsidized add-on to credit markets
for those who are left out. In contrast, “normal” and “mainstream” credit markets are conceived of simply, as
“markets,” governed by market rules and market dynamics. This article argues that they are both part of the same
financial market, which is itself a product of public policy. Instead of financial inclusion, this article proposes to
reframe the problem as a matter of financial redesign. The design of credit markets is an a-priori choice embedded in
law and policy that determines the contours and scope of the credit markets, including who is included.
Reconceptualizing financial inclusion must thus proceed through democratic means because inclusion and access are a
byproduct of institutional design rather than private market decision making.

INTRODUCTION
When Facebook launched its Libra currency, the head of the initiative testified to the Senate
Banking Committee that “Our first goal is to create utility and adoption, enabling people around the
world— especially the unbanked and underbanked—to take part in the financial ecosystem.” 1 Mark
Zuckerberg emphasized the point when he was called to testify to the House of Representatives a
few months later: “The Libra project is about promoting financial inclusion through a safe, low-cost
and efficient way of sending and receiving payments around the world.” 2 Since its inception in 2009,
many in the cryptocurrency industry have promised that one of the main benefits of the distributive
ledger technology is to facilitate financial inclusion of the unbanked. 3 The language of fintech as
Testimony of David Marcus, Head of Calibra, Facebook: Hearing before U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
116th Cong. (2019).
2 Testimony of Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Facebook: Hearing before U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Financial Services, 116th Cong. (2019).
3 GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY MCDONOUGH SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, CENTER FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS AND POLICY,
BLOCKCHAIN AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION: THE ROLE BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY CAN PLAY IN ACCELERATING
FINANCIAL INCLUSION ( 2017); Alejandro Pinto, Unbanked to Big Banks: How Crypto Facilitates Financial Inclusion, IBM
(Apr., 9, 2019), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2019/04/unbanked-to-big-banks-how-crypto-facilitatesfinancial-inclusion/; Pascal Thellmann, How Blockchain is Banking the Unbanked, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/how-blockchain-is-banking-the-unbanked; Examining Regulatory Frameworks
for Digital Currencies and Blockchain: Hearing before U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
1
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financial inclusion is so widespread that one could be forgiven for assuming that increasing access to
credit were the sole aim of these companies. 4 Regulators have responded with their own
encouraging reports pronouncing that fintech, mobile banking, or other innovative new products
will eventually lead to financial inclusion. 5 A commonly held belief in the world of finance is that
what stands between the current landscape of financial exclusion to full financial inclusion is the
right technology or innovation. This is misguided.
This article seeks to reframe the problem of financial inclusion because the current
framework misunderstands the problem to be fixed. In order to find adequate solutions to the
current inequalities of finance, academics and policymakers must challenge the prevailing narratives
about financial inclusion. In proposing a theory of the political economy of finance, this analysis
adds to an emerging body of work by other scholars engaged in counteracting the prevailing market
neoliberal ideology that governs narratives about markets, power, labor, climate. 6
The term “financial inclusion” is a nebulous and overly broad and for being so is also
relatively non-controversial. Financial inclusion is an umbrella concept that encompasses access to
bank accounts, credit products, or financial services of any kind. Murky, too, is the identification of
the problem; among a myriad of financial services, which should be available to all? What services
are essential for participation in commerce? Generally, financial services can be divided into two
categories: the payments system and the credit system. Both of these systems are exclusionary for LMI
individuals and communities; aspects of each can be deemed as essential; and both of these systems
have public or quasi-public features.

LARRY D. WALL, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, FINTECH AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2017) (“[F]intech has
substantial potential to lower the cost of financial services to many lower-income and credit-constrained consumers”);
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES NONBANK FINANCIALS,
FINTECH, AND INNOVATION 9 (2018) at 12 (“Treasury supports encouraging the launch of new business models as well
as enabling traditional financial institutions . . . to pursue innovative technologies to . . . improve access to credit and
other services.”); Stijn Claessens et al., Fintech Credit Markets Around the World: Size, Drivers and Policy Issues, BIS
QUARTERLY REVIEW 29, 30 (2018) (finding financial technology as a pathway to greater financial inclusion); Stephanie
MacConnell, How FinTech Companies are Closing the Banking Gap, Forbes (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephaniemacconnell/2017/10/23/financial-inclusion-do-good-makemoney/#71f023b13fc3; (“FinTech companies and investors are trying to find solutions to this problem so that those on
the margins can become ‘bankable’ . . . .”).
5
Lael Brainard, Governor, U.S. Fed. Reserve Bd., The Opportunities and Challenges of Fintech at the Conference on
Financial Innovation at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Dec. 2, 2016) (transcript available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/ newsevents/speech/brainard20161202a.html) (“One particularly promising aspect of
fintech is the potential to expand access to credit and other financial services for consumers and small businesses.”);
Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Fintech and the New Financial Landscape at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia (Nov. 13, 2018) (“New technology has proven able to improve the customer experience, lower
transaction costs, and increase credit availability. [Fintech] also offers a tremendous opportunity to expand access to the
banking system.”).
6 NELL ABERNATHY ET AL., ROOSEVELT INST., NEW RULES FOR 21ST CENTURY: CORPORATE POWER, PUBLIC POWER,
AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (2019); ANDERS FREMSTAD & MARK PAUL, ROOSEVELT INST.,
TRANSCENDING NEOLIBERALISM: HOW THE FREE-MARKET MYTH HAS PREVENTED CLIMATE ACTION (2019);
SUZANNE KAHN, ROOSEVELT INST., A PROGRESSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR FREE COLLEGE (2019); MIKE KONCZAL ET
AL., ROOSEVELT INST., THE EMPIRICAL FAILURES OF NEOLIBERALISM AND OTHERS (2020); FELICIA WONG,
ROOSEVELT INST., THE EMERGING WORLDVIEW: HOW NEW PROGRESSIVISM IS MOVING BEYOND NEOLIBERALISM
(2020).
4
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When referring to financial inclusion of the “unbanked”, the problem is lack of access to the
payments system. 7 Each purchase, sale, payment, and interaction with commerce is mediated by
financial institutions and or their proxies. Yet the unbanked and underbanked pays a fee or a
premium each time they interact with the payments system. 8 They pay to cash checks, purchase
prepaid debit cards, or send or receive money. 9 This class of fees and interest rates usually fall on
LMI individuals who spend an average of 10% of their annual income on fees. 10 Many communities
have been completely abandoned by the community banks and credit unions that used to serve them
and have been left with alternative service providers such as check cashers, payday lenders, or even a
single gas station ATM that charges a seven dollar fee for every transaction. These transaction costs
are only paid for by those without banking accounts who are usually LMI families. They prove the
adage that it is expensive to be poor. It is also time-consuming and stressful to mediate the various
external services in the economy like check-cashers, Western Union remittance services, bill pay
offices, and pre-paid debit cards. 11 Policymakers, academics, and industry experts recognize that
“financial inclusion” is a worthy policy and business goal and have offered various products,
services, and even subsidies aimed at financial inclusion. 12 Now, more than ever, the economy is
digital, global, and mediated by technology. Those who do not have bank accounts pay a fee every
time they participate in modern commerce. Just as the railroad, telephone, and electricity were once
recognized as essential public utilities, access to payments should also be recognized as an essential
public good.
Financial inclusion also includes “access to credit,” another policy goal actively pursued by
legislators and regulators on the left and the right. 13 There is little consensus on how best to achieve
“access to credit,” but advocates on both the right and left have described a panoply of proposals as
increasing access to credit, rendering the term almost meaningless on its own. Or rather amorphous
and decontextualized and up for grabs to promote any political agenda. While a policy on the left
may propose that breaking up the banks will increase access to credit, one on the right might
See MICHAEL BARR, NO SLACK: THE FINANCIAL LIVES OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2012); FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., 2017 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 1 (2018) (finding that more
than one quarter of Americans are unbanked or underbanked); LISA SERVON, The UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE
NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES (2017).
8 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 2, at 37; see also Peggy Delinois Hamilton, Why the Check Cashers Win: Regulatory
Barriers to Banking the Unbanked, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2007) (explaining the underbanked spend
approximately 2 percent of their income on check cashing alone).
9 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. POSTAL SER., PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE
UNDERSERVED 2 (2014) (noting the unbanked and underbanked spend 9.5 percent of their income on alternative
financial services); see Hamilton, supra note 3, at 119–20.
10 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. POSTAL SER., supra note 4.
11 See generally Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004) (discussing the complex and expensive
regulatory environment of various alternative financial service providers such as pay-day lenders and check cashers).
12 See, e.g., MARIANNE CROWE ET AL., FED. RESERVE OF BOSTON & FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, THE U.S.
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE FOR MOBILE PAYMENTS: SUMMARY REPORT OF MEETING BETWEEN MOBILE PAYMENTS
INDUSTRY WORKGROUP AND FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORS ON APRIL 24, 2012 8 (2012) (explaining the
government’s policy goal of financial inclusion can be aided by mobile technologies); see also Nizan Geslevich Packin &
Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the Right to Be Unnetworked, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 356 (2016) (regulators,
policymakers, academics, and consumers share the understanding that broader financial inclusion is socially desirable).
13 Alvin C. Harrell, Consumer Credit in the 1990's, Part Two--the Coming Bankruptcy Explosion and Its Implications for State Law,
50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 2, 16 (1996) (“[T]he Clinton administration has strongly supported an expansion of
consumer credit over the past two years.”); Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 30 (2009) (discussing how President Bush’s policies that lowered lending standard
extended access to credit especially for mortgages).
7
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advocate complete deregulation of banking markets to increase access to credit. 14 In the business
context, many innovative technologies premise their enterprise as increasing financial inclusion
through a variety of apps, platforms or networks. A wide range of credit products like payday loans,
peer to peer loans, micro-credit, mobile banking, alternative mortgage loans, bitcoin, and other nonbank credit products describe their services as “financial inclusion, “access to credit” or alternatively
of “democratizing credit.” 15
This article describes three general categories for financial inclusion and access to credit in
frequent use in the modern finance and policy corridors: First, the product-innovation model focuses on
technology or new market innovations including fintech, mobile banking, blockchain technology
and other tech products. The second face of inclusion is the “gap filling” model, which is usually
focused on removing discriminatory elements of the “normal” credit system. For example,
legislation like the CRA attempt to increase access to credit by persuading the mainstream banking
system to lend into formerly redlined areas due to previous discrimination. 16 The ECOA aims to
censure banks that deny “access to credit” to individuals due to discrimination based on a protected
class status. 17 The third category of financial inclusion efforts are the “subsidy/micro-credit model”
which includes philanthropy and/ or govern subsidies that bolster micro-credit or nonprofit
community banking, technology, and other grassroots efforts.
The wide array of solutions and problems related to financial inclusion and access to credit
are usually discussed separately because each has distinct characteristics and approaches. For
example, fintech solutions and anti-discrimination laws seem to be completely unrelated in the
problem they are attempting to remedy and the solution they offer. There is very little overlap in the
interest groups or political parties pushing these various models for financial inclusion and access to
credit. Yet this article will make the case that all of these paradigms share a common hypothesis and
are all based on a flawed theoretical paradigm of credit markets. The misconception they share is in
fact pervasive in “neoliberal” legal and financial discourse. 18 The foundational theory is that credit
markets and the financial circuitry of the economy are a neutral byproduct of market forces. 19 This
Joel Anderson, Trump Is Deregulating Banks: Here's What That Means for You, NASDAQ (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/trump-deregulating-banks-heres-what-means-you-2019-02-12.
15 See infra Part I; See also Jean Braucher, Theories of Overindebtedness: Interaction of Structure and Culture, 7 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 323, 335 (2006) (“[C]reditors sometimes portray [alternative financial services] as promoting the
democratization of credit . . . .”).
16 See Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 523
(2005) (discussing the CRA’s purpose was to increase access to credit to previously discriminated against racial
minorities); Cassandra Jones Havard, Advancing the Cra-Using the Cra’s Strategic Plan Option to Promote Community Inclusion:
The CRA and Community Inclusion, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 37, 39 (2006) (“The CRA’s basic premise [is] to
[make] credit available across all neighborhoods . . . .”).
17 See Vlad A. Hertza, Fighting Unfair Classifications in Credit Reporting: Should the United States Adopt Gdpr-Inspired Rights in
Regulating Consumer Credit?, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1707, 1724 (2018) (“The ECOA prohibits discrimination based on
protected characteristics such as race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age.”).
18 Neoliberalism is a term overloaded with misuse and misunderstanding and I use it with reservation because I believe it
is still the best label for the theories under critique in this article. There is a large body of recent academic work by
historians, political scientists, economists, and legal scholars on neoliberalism that has created more clarity in the field
and precision in the definition. The clearest definition of neoliberalism is a market-centered model of policy. The term is
used generally in a derogatory manner by many on the political left. See generally DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF
NEOLIBERALISM (2005).
19 Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783,
785 n.2 (2003) (defining neoliberalism as the “contemporary reincarnation of the nineteenth-century ‘laissez-faire’
liberalism that advanced the primacy of ‘the market’ over ‘government regulation.’”).
14
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view conceives of financial inclusion or the lack thereof as a “bug” or a gap in the general circuitry.
The solutions to the problem of financial exclusion range from creating new products outside the
“normal” credit system or filling gaps that have been created by bad actors. Those who find
themselves outside of the normal channels of credit and money therefore must be “included” in the
credit market using a different device or method than what is offered to those who already have access
to credit and financial services. Those who cannot access a normal loan can receive a microcredit,
peer to peer, or a payday loan. Those who do not have a bank account can be given an alternative
route to transactions such as a check cashing service, a newly designed fintech product, or an
alternative blockchain currency. 20
Not only does the confused rhetoric of access to credit and financial inclusion lead to failed
policy to address financial exclusion, but it also elides an accurate understanding of the mainstream
credit markets. Or rather, it does not discuss them at all, taking “the norm” for granted and focusing
instead on the periphery. According to the standard neoliberal perspective, the scope, quantity and
the circumference of the credit markets are a neutral and natural byproduct of market forces. 21
Credit markets are seen through a prism of natural law—credit is given to the creditworthy and
withheld to those who are not. There are gaps created by “market failures” that subsidies or financial
education can overcome, but the credit market itself operates in neutral conditions. No one is
deciding to exclude. In this model of financial inclusion, the design of the credit system is an innate
characteristic of the market and not a result of decision-making. A designing entity or policy-creator
is absent or irrelevant—presumably credit decisions are guided by the invisible forces of the market.
People who are excluded find themselves outside of the financial markets because they are not
“creditworthy” either due to too little money or cause too high of a risk, or because there is a flaw in
the system such as discrimination that excluded otherwise “credit-worthy” individuals. 22 They must
pay more for credit and financial services because the market determines the price of the service and
credit and those costs reflect the added risk. In order to achieve “financial inclusion,” lenders must
either charge more to respond to higher risk (i.e. check-cashing), rely on subsidies to overcome
market failure or the lack of information by consumers, rely on philanthropy or legislative gapfilling. 23
This article proposes a new theoretical approach to financial inclusion that recognizes
financial inclusion as an a priori design decision as opposed to an after-the fact remedy tacked on to
a “normal credit system.” To use a tangible analogy, imagine a house contains those with access to
credit and banking services inside the house and those who do not have access outside the house.
The predominant financial inclusion model proposes that someone—either a charity or an
entrepreneur approach the people outside of the house with a financial product specifically designed
for those outside the house or in the alternative to make sure the house isn’t discriminating against
outsiders who should be in the house for a reason such as their race or gender. The other option,
See Braucher, supra note 10.
See McCluskey, supra note 14.
22 See Nick Clements, 6 Reasons You Can Be Rejected With An Excellent Credit Score, (Mar. 24, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nickclements/2015/03/24/6-reasons-you-can-be-rejected-with-an-excellent-creditscore/#7170d305efe3; Jill Cornfield, Low-income Americans Get Double Squeeze From Poor Credit and High Fees, CNBC (Sept.
19, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/19/poor-credit-keeps-low-income-people-paying-higher-fees-and-stiffinterest-rates.html; Aaron Klein, Credit Denial In The Age Of AI, BROOKINGS INST. (April 11, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/credit-denial-in-the-age-of-ai/.
23 Eric Dash, Risky Borrowers Find Credit Again, at a Price, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/13/business/13credit.html; Cornfield, supra note 17.
20
21
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which this article proposes, is to design a house that fits everybody. If that sounds simplistic, it is.
There are of course caveats and complexities, but not enough to invalidate the analogy. The design
of the credit and financial marketplace determines who has access to credit and financial services.
The current design was not an organic development, but a result of a series of policy and
institutional decisions. In other words, the house of credit was built by a designer who decided who
would fit inside and who would not. These foundational decisions have had distributional effects.
Instead of filling gaps and offering new and different products to increase access to credit and
services, we must change the design to ensure democratic access. In other words, the
“democratization of credit” cannot be achieved through market products, but through democracy
itself.
This article proposes a structural perspective on credit markets that relies on a theory of
money as a democratic medium. 24 This theory draws on pivotal Progressive-era political debates
over the nature and structure of US currency premised on the connection of monetary choices and
distributional effects. 25 The many charged debates about the monetary standard—either the gold
standard, bimetallism (gold and silver) or fiat currency—were decisions about how much money and
credit would be available and to whom. 26 Gold was intrinsically limited and scarce while fiat currency
was flexible and expansionary. 27 The choice to maintain the gold standard or abandon it for fiat
currency or silver had distributional effects and was made democratically though not without
dispute. Those debates were resolved over several decades and several elections, but the fact that the
monetary system is a matter for debate was lost. In other words, the body populace can choose and
has chosen the formula for its monetary system yet having made the choice has taken its formulation
for granted.
In rejecting the current model of financial inclusion, this article advocates a renewed
academic and debate in the political economy of money and credit. The article will advocate a
public and democratic process of decision-making towards a theory of financial expansion instead of
financial inclusion. It advocates a revived focus on the legal design decisions at the center of the
money and credit markets as opposed to a market-centric focus on the excluded outside the normal
credit system. This theory of money and credit has vast implications on money and credit system
design and economic regulation, but it is not without historic precedent or theoretical support,
which will be outlined below. Indeed, credit and money are more fungible and abstract the higher up
one looks in the financial system. For the Fed’s balance sheets and their accounts with JP Morgan,
money creation is a credit on a balance sheet rather than a real constraint on spending. The lower
down one goes in the financial system, money becomes much more real. For a nurse or taxi driver
paying her rent, utilities, and food prices with limited wages, every cent of money must go toward a
tangible object. When average people take out credit, their interest payments remove money real
spending money from their wages that they cannot use for food or rent. When the Fed pays JP
Morgan millions of dollars of interest on their reserves, it barely makes a dent. The comparison
between individuals with banks falls apart when we consider the role banks play in the economy, but
if the focus is just on credit and money forms, it is helpful to keep in mind the stark contrasts.
Access to credit is a decision made by policymakers. 28
CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM 37 (2014).
See WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMMER, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN ALL THE LEADING NATIONS 413 (1896).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 NEAL WALTERS & SHARON HERMANSON, CREDIT SCORES AND MORTGAGE LENDING 5 (2001).
24
25
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Returning to the problem of inclusion and access, this article will make the case that insofar
as the financial system is the product of legal design emanating from the democratic process, it
cannot be justified if it results in the exclusion of such a large segment of the populace. Especially if
those excluded are the poor and vulnerable. The article then proposes a democratic design that relies
on public finance and an inclusionary credit market.
In Part I, I will propose a taxonomy to understand the various models of financial inclusion,
including the product model, the gap-filling model, and subsidy model and demonstrate their
common theoretical foundations in neoliberal views of credit markets. Part II will describe the
modern financial markets in both transactional accounts (the payments system) as well as the credit
markets. This Part shows that the core of both payment and credit systems are each public whereas
those who fall outside of them must rely on private products. Incidentally, those who are excluded
pay much more than those who receive subsidized public products. Part III introduces a new
theoretical understanding of money and credit production, which integrates the emerging literature
on money as a democratic medium and progressive era debates about gold and silver to demonstrate
the lost concept of money as a legal decision. This Part also demonstrates how the concept of
financial redesign differs from the concept of financial inclusion and how a new foundational theory
of inclusion can lead to more accurate policymaking. The concept of financial redesign views the
question of access through the lens of money and credit design that is a foundational decision at the
core of the credit system. This article concludes with a discussion of the normative implications of
this new theoretical framework.
PART I
This part describes the current rhetoric on financial inclusion used by the industry,
regulators, academics, and media. When discussing financial inclusion, regulators and private actors
use the terms “access to credit,” “the democratization of credit,” “filling gaps,” or offering new
technology or innovative products. 29 In order to depict the problem two-dimensionally, I have
represented the “house” of financial inclusion below (Figure A) as circles with an inner circle of
credit access and an outer ring of lack of access this is the space for financial inclusion efforts.
(Figure B places the different models of inclusion in the circle.) Credit is represented as a finite good
at the center with access diminishing the further out a consumer gets from the center. Proximity to
access usually correlates with wealth and income. Financial inclusion is usually a problem for LMI
individuals left out of the central credit markets. 30 Those with access are more creditworthy than

FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2018-2022 STRATEGIC PLAN (2018); Barr, supra note 6, at 163 (urging legislators to pursue
“alternative credit products” to increase access to credit to the poor); See, e.g., Dan Schulman, Time to Democratize the
Banking System, CNBC (July 21, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/21/paypal-ceo-time-to-democratize-thebanking-system-commentary.html (arguing for the use of technology to “democratize credit”); Lael Brainard, Governor,
U.S. Fed. Reserve Bd., FinTech and the Search for Full Stack Financial Inclusion at FinTech, Financial Inclusion, and
the Potential to Transform Financial Services (Oct. 17, 2018) (transcript available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20181017a.htm); see also Examining Opportunities and
Challenges in the Financial Technology (“FinTech”) Marketplace: Hearing Before Subcommittee on Fin. Servs.’, 115th Cong. (2018)
(discussing the use of financial technology to increase access to credit); infra Part I.
30 CHERYL R. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45979, FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND CREDIT ACCESS POLICY ISSUES 1
(2019).
29
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those without access with the exception of certain groups who have been discriminated against even
despite their creditworthiness. 31

Figure A
This misleading conceptualization of access creates several problems. First, this model of
credit and financial inclusions views access to credit as a sliding scale—merely a matter of more
credit or less credit. To increase access and inclusion necessarily requires more credit. Access to credit
measures have had a ratcheting up effect. 32 Payday lenders, title lenders, subprime lenders, and other
high cost lenders use “access to credit” to justify their services. 33 Access to credit discourse usually
does too little to discern between the quality of credit available, usually focusing primarily on the
quantity available. Second and more fundamentally, this model takes for granted the credit at the
center. Instead, it shifts focus to the outer rings. It presupposes those at the center of the credit
market deserve credit and access. As the next section illustrates, access to credit is a decision made
by policymakers. In fact, as we move further away from the core toward the periphery, the federal
subsidies diminish. It is therefore misleading to focus regulatory efforts at financial inclusion as an
ancillary product supplementing the normal credit markets without examining the entirety of the
system as an integrated whole, all of which is a result of public policy. The rest of this section
categorizes the three domains in which access to credit is discusses and explains the common
theoretical underpinning of their vision of credit.

Id. at 1, 20;
See Generally LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT
(1999); LUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK (2012); Harrell, supra note 8; Moran,
supra note 8.
33 See Neil Bhutta et al., Consumer Borrowing After Payday Loan Bans, 59 J.L. & ECON. 225, 226 (2016) (noting that
supporters of payday lending emphasize its value to low-income households because it provides access to credit);
Michael Kenneth, Payday Lending: Can "Reputable" Banks End Cycles of Debt?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 710 (2008) (arguing
that properly regulated payday lending expands credit and “should be [viewed as] a positive business practice under the
CRA.”).
31
32
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Figure B
Three Types of Access to Credit
i) The Innovative Credit Product: Fintech
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In this model, financial inclusion envisions a product or new innovative design that promises
inclusion or access to credit. The provider of the new product can be a bank, a technology company,
or non-profit. 34 These products either focus on a fee model in the case of paypal, a network
connecting borrowers and lenders in the case of P2P or a newly designed system such as blockchain
or other alternative methods of access. Getting the right product requires either technical
innovation, marketing, or financial education. These models and products assume that those who
fall outside the inner circle of credit have special or different needs and these products are meant
specifically to match those needs. Broadly, these services are usually referred to as “fintech.” Fintech
includes but is not limited to blockchain technology, mobile banking, internet mediated peer to peer
lending, and algorithmic lending products. 35 This is currently the most popular model for increasing
access. 36
When banking regulators and policymakers refer to access to credit, they often discuss
fintech as the primary solution. 37 Likewise, when fintech providers discuss their new products, they
justify them as increasing access to credit or furthering financial inclusion. 38 In 2018, the OCC
offered a banking charter to fintech providers for the first time and justified their controversial
decision using the rhetoric of financial inclusion. 39 Comptroller Otting said that fintech firms would
NIKI COHEN ET AL., REIMAGINING FINANCIAL INCLUSION 13 (2015) (arguing that proper product design will lead to
greater financial inclusion).
35 Anton Didenko, Regulating Fintech: Lessons from Africa, 19 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 311, 318 (2018) (“FinTech is
commonly used today to refer to the more recent technological advancements in finance, such as online peer-to-peer
lending platforms or automated robo-advisory.”); John Schindler, FinTech and Financial Innovation: Drivers and Depth 2 (Bd.
of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys. Fin. & Econs.’ Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2017-081, 2017)
(defining fintech as including “online marketplace lending (called peer-to-peer lending by some), equity crowdfunding,
robo-advice, financial applications of distributed ledger technology, and financial applications of machine learning (also
referred to as artificial intelligence and machine intelligence.”).
36 George Walker, Financial Technology Law-A New Beginning and A New Future, 50 INT’L LAW. 137, 139 (2017) (noting the
“substantial growth in FinTech technologies and applications in recent years.”); Stephanie MacConnell, How FinTech
Companies are Closing the Banking Gap, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephaniemacconnell/2017/10/23/financial-inclusion-do-good-makemoney/#71f023b13fc3; Schindler, supra note 29, at 1 (observing fintech as the “hot” topic in finance and the amount of
attention fintech is currently receiving).
37 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL SUPPLEMENT:
CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 1 (2018); U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND
INNOVATION 9 (2018) (recommending financial technology to increase access to credit); LARRY D. WALL, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, FINTECH AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2017); DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R44614, MARKETPLACE LENDING: FINTECH IN CONSUMER AND SMALL BUSINESS LENDING 12 (2018)
(explaining Fintech can “increase[] credit availability for some borrowers without access to bank credit.”); Tobias Berg et
al., On the Rise of the FinTechs—Credit Scoring Using Digital Footprints (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Working Paper No. 2018–04,
2018) (“[Financial technology] can facilitate access to credit when credit bureau scores do not exist, thereby fostering
financial inclusion and lowering inequality.”); Lael Brainard, supra note 23; Alan Greenspan, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve
Bd., Remarks at The Federal Reserve System’s Fourth Annual Community Affairs Research Conference, (Apr. 8, 2005)
(transcript available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050408/default.htm)
(“Unquestionably, innovation and deregulation have vastly expanded credit availability to virtually all income classes.”).
38 See COHEN, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
39 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 31; see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
CURRENCY, OCC BEGINS ACCEPTING NATIONAL BANK CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES (2018) (explaining the OCC’s decision to consider charter applications from financial technology companies
in part, because of the OCC’s commitment to financial inclusion).
34
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provide “consumers greater choice, can promote financial inclusion, and creates a more level playing
field for financial services competition.” 40 In their policy decision, the OCC said that they expected
the fintech companies seeking a banking charter “to demonstrate a commitment to financial
inclusion.” 41
Industry experts, regulators, and academics often link financial inclusion with product
design. 42 In study after study, consultants, regulators, and industry experts study the problem of
financial inclusion through the lens of financial technology and product design. 43 These studies often
point to the distinct behavior of the unbanked and underbanked and how financial inclusion efforts
must be based on recognizing these differences. Experts instruct entrepreneurs to bring the insights
of behavioral economics to bear in designing new products. “Instead of trying to make LMI
consumers fit the products financial institutions already offer,” the report instructs, “we need to ask
how new products could fit the needs of LMI consumers while also being profitable enough for
financial institutions to offer broadly.” 44 These reports often focus on financial education and
literacy as a means of financial inclusion. 45 In 2019, the head of the CFPB, Kathleen Kraninger
explained that the agency’s primary goal would be financial education. 46
Financial literacy and innovative design are usually tied to a behavioral economics
understanding of financial inclusion. These models rely on behavioral economics both to describe
the problem of financial access and to overcome it. Analysts promise that by “drawing on the wealth
of research on the financial lives of LMI consumers and insights from behavioral science,” they can
create “an innovative product design that holds the promise of financial stability for consumers and
significant profitability for institutions.” 47 Specifically, a fintech product must help LMI customers to
“manage their cash flow volatility and the behavioral issues this volatility drives.” 48 Fintech products
with “behavioral “nudges” like well-timed reminders can help institutions manage default risk and
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 33.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’
ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS (2018).
42 See COHEN, supra note 28, at 13.
43 Id. (arguing that proper product design will lead to greater financial inclusion); MCKINSEY & COMPANY, MOBILE
MONEY IN EMERGING MARKETS: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION 7 (2018) (explaining that “large scale
digital finance promotes financial inclusion.”); MCKINSEY & COMPANY & MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, DIGITAL
FINANCE FOR ALL: POWERING INCLUSIVE GROWTH IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 6 (2016) (explaining the ability for
digital financial products to “enable broad-based financial inclusion.”); DAN RADCLIFFE & RODGER VOORHIES, A
DIGITAL PATHWAY TO FINANCIAL INCLUSION 7 (2012) (“The expansion of digital payment platforms offers the
opportunity to link poor people with providers of savings, credit, and insurance products.”);
44 See COHEN, supra note 28, at 13.
45 See Jonathan Bays et al., Global financial inclusion: Within Reach, MCKINSEY & CO. (Oct. 2010) (discussing that any
financial products must be accompanied by financial education to be truly effective); Trina R. Williams Shanks et al.,
Financial Education and Financial Access: Lessons Learned from Child Development Account Research, 8 INNOVATIONS: TECH.,
GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 159, 170 (2013) (finding “the need for both financial education and access to financial
products and services” for low income parents and children to be “truly inclusive” in order to achieve greater financial
inclusion); Ryan Scott, Addressing Poverty Through Digital and Financial Literacy, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/causeintegration/2016/01/07/addressing-poverty-through-digital-and-financialliteracy/#1b18dcf310b3 (“Financial literacy is critical to avoiding high levels of debt, excess fees for financial products,
accessing credit and saving for retirement.”).
46 Kathleen L. Kraninger, Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Speech at the Bipartisan Policy Center (Apr.
17, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/kathleen-kraninger-directorconsumer-financial-protection-bureau-bipartisan-policy-center-speech/).
47 See COHEN, supra note 28, at 13.
48 Id. at 7.
40
41
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reduce expected losses associated with these loans.” 49 The concept of nudges builds on Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler’s ideas in their book and are meant to overcome behavioral tendencies
creating “irrational behavior.” 50 The framework of behavioral economics further embeds
neoliberalism because it centers the ideal of “homo-economicus.” Humans make rational economic
choices, but with the exception of a few “bugs.” The aim of the project is to make us aware of these
bugs or biases so that we can resume being rational economic actors. This framework offers the
poor and disenfranchised “nudges” to spur better decision-making or financial literacy.
The product innovation model attempts to better understand LMI consumers and to design
products to serve their needs. These products and services usually operate outside of or apart from
the mainstream credit market. They are products or services that rely on creating a market or
meeting a need in the market that is not otherwise served. Usually, the aim of this model is to make
profits for the creators of the products, but there are several social entrepreneurs who are focused
instead on modest profits through social good and helping LMI communities. Some of these
enterprises, like blockchain, aim for bigger utopian aims such as the democratization of all finance.
They aim to reach financial inclusion by decentering the banking sector. 51 To state the obvious, in
order to make profits, these products must cost something. Or as an industry report quotes a bank
executive, “the juice had better be worth the squeeze.” 52 This is the largest obstacle fintech products
have faced in serving LMI consumers. They are trying to squeeze profits out of an already cashstrapped consumer group. Some fintech lenders have been able to compete with banks by using
algorithmic underwriting, AI, or using consumer to make lending decisions. 53 These practices have
Id. at 45.
Behavioral economics has debunked the ideal of homo economicus, the rational market actor, and thus challenges
mainstream economic thinking. Behavioral economics has been central to proposals for increased regulation and has
become a pervasive topic in legal literature. Behavioral economics explains that people make irrational decisions based
on several built-in biases. This rich and useful literature has been deployed to help refine and better legal decisionmaking. However, in the realm of financial decision-making, behavioral economics tends to focus only on the irrational
decisionmaking of the poor. See generally John McMahon, Behavioral Economics as Neoliberalism: Producing and Governing Homo
Economicus, 14 CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY 137 (2015); COHEN, supra note 23, at 45 (“Borrowers at a
microlender in Uganda were more likely to pay on time if sent a monthly text message reminder that the payment was
due, with an effect equivalent to a 25% interest rate reduction. A microlender in Texas found that a series of email and
text reminders and redesigned monthly statements helped microloan borrowers avoid NSF fees. A consumer’s
relationship with her financial institution is also important. 34% of unbanked consumers report dislike of or distrust in
banks as a reason for being unbanked. Anecdotally, strong relationships between tellers and customers at a checkcashing facility in New York City were a primary driver of customer loyalty. Relationship-building techniques can reduce
losses, and these techniques can be relatively cheap when delivered through phone calls or text messages.”).
51 See SALT LENDING, SALT: BLOCKCHAIN-BACKED LOANS (2017) (“SALT is a lending platform specifically designed
for blockchain assets; operating as a second layer protocol which sits atop any public or permissioned blockchain,
allowing the underlying asset to be used as collateral for access to credit.”); LBA FOUNDATION, LIBRA CREDIT
WHITEPAPER (2018) (“Libra Credit is a decentralized lending ecosystem that facilitates open access to credit anywhere
and anytime based on the Ethereum blockchain.”); Dirk Zetzsche et al., The ICO Gold Rush: It's a Scam, It's a Bubble, It's a
Super Challenge for Regulators (Univ. of New S. Wales L. Research Series, Working Paper No. 2017-011, 2018) (noting that
although “the traditional banking sector has been reluctant to invest in ICOs,” they “have the potential to be more
accessible to the public in their somewhat democratic nature”); Connor Blenkinsop, Blockchain Ecosystem to Give Unbanked
Access to Financial Services in Developing Countries, COINTELEGRAPH (June 28, 2018),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/blockchain-ecosystem-to-give-unbanked-access-to-financial-services-in-developingcountries.
52 Jeffrey Webber, Sometimes ‘the Juice Ain’t Worth the Squeeze,’ BUS. & INDUSTRY CONNECTION MAG., (July 15, 2015),
https://www.bicmagazine.com/industry/investment-banking/juice-aint-worth-the-squeeze/.
53 Robert P. Bartlett et al., Consumer Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era, U.C. BERKELEY PUB. L. RES. PAPER 1 (2017)
(“Recently, technology-enabled ‘FinTech’ loan companies have sought to drive significant cost reductions in the
underwriting process by improving [credit] scoring precision with big-data algorithms.”).
49
50
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come under intense scrutiny because of the embedded discrimination in their data. These fintech
companies perpetuate racism and exclusion because they rely on discriminatory assumptions about
their customers. 54
To the extent fintech companies have been profitable, they have sold their products to
higher income consumers. Services like Venmo, paypal, square, and others have provided alternative
products that add ease and efficiency for customers with bank accounts. Those fintech products that
have successfully increased access to credit or finance are those that are based on the non-profit
model such as Kiva or gofundme. The 2007 FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program was a
temporary program focused on providing new accounts and small loans to excluded populations. 55
The two-year pilot began with 31 participant banks that were given regulatory latitude to design
small dollar credit products to consumers to take the place of payday loans. 56 The point of the pilot
was to determine whether banks could successfully make these loans—success was determined by
whether banks could make these loans profitably. 57 The FDIC concluded that the pilot was a success
and “demonstrated that banks can offer alternatives to high-cost, emergency credit products, such as
payday loans or overdrafts.” 58 The FDIC determined that the “pilot resulted in a Safe, Affordable,
and Feasible Small-Dollar Loan Template that other banks can replicate” and that “loans originated
under the program have a default risk similar to other types of unsecured credit.” 59 The program was
not continued or replicated in any other agencies. Since the small dollar programs, most efforts at
access to credit emanating from the banking regulators has focused on fintech. In fact, the FDIC
followed up this small dollar loan program with several reports on mobile banking as the most
promising path toward financial inclusion. 60 In outlining their financial inclusion programs, mobile
banking for the FDIC has become basically synonymous with financial inclusion. 61 The FDIC began
measuring the amount of “unbanked” or “underbanked” Americans annually starting in 2009 and
has issued many reports about potential technological solutions. The FDIC has released several
white papers and reports on mobile banking with the repeated key finding that “MFS (Mobile
Financial Services) is best positioned to have an economic inclusion impact through its ability to
meet the day-to-day financial services needs of underbanked consumers as well as consumers at risk
of account closure.” 62
Id. at 2-3 (“Algorithms could easily be implemented to predict default based on the exact college or high school one
attended.…We find that African-American and Hispanic applicants are 5% more likely to be rejected for a mortgage
than other applicants.”); see also Karen Petrou, Making “Responsible Innovation” a Reality: Big Tech, Small Money, and U.S.
Economic Equality, FED. FIN. ANALYTICS 4 (“The power embedded in AI (artificial intelligence) also may combine with
massive troves of data to enable seemingly-predictive methodologies that in fact target financial customers in ways that
change availability, pricing, terms, and conditions in discriminatory ways.”).
55 See generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FDIC’S SMALL-DOLLAR LOAN PILOT PROGRAM
23 (2008).
56 Id. at 26.
57 Id. at 26-27.
58 Id. at 37.
59 Id.
60 SUSAN BURHOUSE ET AL., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES TO
ENGAGE UNDERSERVED CONSUMERS: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS 1 (2016) (“The results of this research show
that great potential exists for MFS [mobile financial services] to improve account sustainability by helping underserved
consumers obtain more control over their funds and better manage their bank accounts.”).
61 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC INCLUSION POTENTIAL OF MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES
(2014) (stating “MFS is best positioned to have an economic inclusion impact through its ability to meet the day-to-day
financial services needs of underbanked consumers”).
62 Id.
54
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Gap-Filling Legislation and Regulations

There are several strands and categories of regulation and legislation aimed at financial
inclusion and access to credit. 63 These acts differ in their enforcement provisions and their focus,
but they share, in broad strokes, an understanding of the problem of access to credit. These bills aim
to fill gaps in the credit market—gaps due to discrimination—but solutions range from legal
penalties for discrimination to inducements like tax credits for increased lending. Some of the
legislation focused on financial inclusion aims to “unblock” the gap in access to credit by prohibiting
discrimination while another strand intended to actively fill the gap with credit. 64
After the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s and the women’s movement of the 1970s,
Congress passed legislation that prohibited credit discrimination based on race and gender. Two
pivotal anti-discrimination bills were the 1968 Fair Housing Act 65 outlawing discrimination in
housing and mortgage lending and the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 66 which banned
discrimination for all other credit products. These Acts created a constitutional right of equal access
to credit. Credit itself was not a right, but a lender could not deprive an individual of credit based on

See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA); the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 (ECOA).
See, e.g., the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA)
which seeks to curb discriminatory lending practices by, respectively, mandating a certain level of lending in LMI
neighborhoods and requiring public disclosure of mortgage data as it relates to ethnicity in order that the public can
monitor for discriminatory patterns.
65 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2018)
66 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2018).
63
64
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a protected trait. These acts were premised on negative rights, or freedom from discrimination. 67 Yet these
rights did nothing to remedy past patterns of credit discrimination or induce the provision of credit.
Insofar as access was restricted due to discrimination, these laws increased access to credit, 68 but in
the event that access was restricted due to other causes, these laws did not increase access to credit.
In the event of racial segregation and a history of credit discrimination, these laws did not offer a
robust remedy. 69 Due to historic segregation and racial exclusion, racial minorities had less wealth
and lived in communities with concentrated poverty. Lenders could deny an applicant due to a lower
credit score or for simply having too little money or income without running afoul of these laws and
many did. 70
There was also legislation aimed at increasing access to credit through a positive rights or
freedom to concept of credit. The 1977 Community Reinvestment Act requires banks to take
affirmative steps to increase credit and financial services to the LMI communities in their area of
service. 71 The aim of the CRA was to remedy the historic effects of redlining. 72 The CRA proceeds
on the theory that banks have discriminated against redlined communities thereby cutting off credit
to these communities. The CRA withholds certain regulatory approvals from banks that refuse to
lend into these communities. The vision of the bill is to fill gaps created by past discrimination. The
CRA is distinct from the anti-discrimination bills because it focuses on geographical zones of
exclusion as opposed to discrimination of individuals. The CRA, like the anti-discrimination bills is
focused on gap-filling, but it is a positive rights focus. It asks banks to fill the gap, the gap being
defined as discriminated regions deprived of credit due to historic wrongs. 73

Self-help and Subsidies

Michael S. Barr, Modes of Credit Market Regulation, in Building Assets, BUILDING WEALTH: CREATING WEALTH IN LOWINCOME COMMUNITIES 18 (Nicolas Restisnas & Eric Belsky ed., 2005) (noting that these laws “prohibit the conduct
rather than subsidizing adherence to the rule.”).
68 Id. at 19.
69 Id. at 20 (“Given the complex and proprietary nature of credit scoring systems and the difficulty of proving that any
two applicants are similarly situated except for race, disparate treatment is hard to prove. Disparate impact analysis is
often no easier.”).
70 See BARADARAN, supra note 67, at 150 (explaining lender’s use of zip codes to discriminate because segregation “had
almost perfectly correlated geography and race.”).
71 29 U.S.C. §§ 2901-03, 2906 (2000).
72 WARREN L. DENNIS, THE COMMUNITY RE-INVESTMENT ACT OF 1977: ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ITS IMPACT
ON APPLICATIONS FOR CHANGES IN STRUCTURE MADE BY DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS TO THE FOUR FEDERAL
FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY AGENCIES (1978).
73 Id.
67
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The micro-credit/self-help model is the reigning model abroad when it comes to socially
beneficial credit. 74 The theory of microcredit is the motivating theory underlying the most prominent
legislative and regulatory efforts at financial inclusion in the United States. Even as microcredit has
fallen from its sanctified pedestal aboard, it is still the dominant answer to financial inclusion as
expressed through the CDFI and minority banking programs in the United States. As I have written
extensively elsewhere, these efforts were especially prominent to neoliberal models of markets in the
Reagan and Clinton administrations. 75
There are various models for financial inclusion based on micro-credit lending that range from
informal lending circles to formal non-profits. Informal lending circles have existed in many
communities where mainstream banking was not accessible or among disenfranchised populations
excluded from mainstream banking services. 76 The typical lending circle, the supposed inspiration
for formal micro-credit organizations, includes a small group of people who contribute funds into a
collective and rotate a lump sum loan around the group of participants. 77 When the loans are repaid,
the funds go back into the collective. 78 In the typical microcredit model, first popularized by
Muhammad Yunus of Grameen bank, a group of indigenous poor women form a collective group
and Grameen relies on the group’s social cohesion and sometimes pressure to return the loan. 79 In
Olaf Weber, Social Banking: Products and Services, in SOC. BANKS AND THE FUTURE OF SUSTAINABLE FIN. 96 (2010)
(stating that “micro-finance and especially microcredit became well known as a social-banking product that is able to
fight poverty” and that “microfinance is probably one of the most popular social banking products and enjoys a very
good reputation”).
75 See, e.g., BARADARAN, supra note 67.
76 Mary Ager Caplan, Communities Respond to Predatory Lending, 59 NAT’L ASS’N OF SOC. WORKERS 149, 153 (2014) (noting
that “a ‘lending circle’ is a[n] … example of a community-based alternative to mainstream banks and predatory
lenders.”).
77 Id. (explaining “a lending circle is composed of a group of unrelated people who contribute money to a common pot,
which is then distributed on a regular or as-needed basis to a member of the group.”).
78 Id.
79 See generally David Hulme, The Story of the Grameen Bank: From Subsidised Microcredit to Market-Based Microfinance (Brooks
World Poverty Inst., Working Paper No. 60, 2008).
74
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the Grameen model, the loans are for entrepreneurship. 80 Yunus’s slogan was: “we are all
entrepreneurs.” 81
The microcredit organizations that are highlighted in the United States and abroad are
usually not grass-roots organizations, but non-profits that bring together impoverished individuals
with microloans provided through external sources. 82 In the Unites States, microlenders like
ACCION and Mission Asset Fund are non-profits that offer small loans to be used for
entrepreneurial activity and paid back over time. 83 Accion’s interest rates of are comparable or
higher than bank loans, the difference being that they offer smaller loans to borrowers who would
not qualify for typical bank loans. 84 There are thousands of microcredit non-profits in the US and
abroad that operate as non-profit organizations and other micro-lenders that offer small loans at a
much higher interest than banks or credit cards. 85
The United States does not have a robust microcredit market referred to as such. Rather, in
the United States, the micro-credit model was embedded into legislation. The Community
Development Financial Institution Act (CDFIA) introduced by President Clinton to achieve
financial inclusion and access to credit was inspired by the micro-credit model. 86 The President
claimed to be inspired by Yunus and Shorebank in Chicago based on community lending and he
created the legislation in order to foster and subsidize more of these “development banks” to
increase credit in communities. 87 The CDFI bill was primarily focused on financial inclusion
80 Miriam Cosic, ‘We are all entrepreneurs’: Muhammad Yunus on Changing the World, One Microloan At a Time, GUARDIAN,
(Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2017/mar/29/we-are-all-entrepreneursmuhammad-yunus-on-changing-the-world-one-microloan-at-a-time.
81 Id.
82 Ben Pimentel, 13 Top U.S. Microlenders for Your Small Business, MKT. WATCH, (Jan. 5, 2017),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/13-top-us-microlenders-for-your-small-business-2017-01-05.
83 Id.
84 See generally ACCION, https://us.accion.org/small-business-loans/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) (listing the interest rates
range).
85 Pimentel, supra note 79 (conceding “microloans have limitations”).
86 Lois J.D. Wacquant & William Julius Wilson, Poverty, Joblessness, and the Social Transformation of the Inner City, in WELFARE
POLICY FOR THE 1990S (1989); James Post & Fiona Wilson, Too Good to Fail, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 66 (2011);
see also Interview with Bill Clinton, President of the U.S., in N.Y.C. (Dec. 15, 2007) (Bill Clinton: “First, it is almost
universally effective where it's done based on the same model that he and other big givers in Bangladesh have used. That
is, where you realize you may be dealing with people who never have a balance sheet, but they have a good reputation in
the community, you know they have a skill, and there is clearly a market for what they want to do. In the early '80s, the
South Shore Bank in Chicago, now called Shore Bank started loaning -- make microcredit loans by American standards
to black carpenters and Croatian electricians to work together to retrieve the South Side. Hillary found out about this
and talked to me, and she went out and raised some money to create a rural microcredit bank in Arkansas, do the same
thing with the same results. It's still in place. Then when I became president, we gave two million microcredit loans a
year overseas, and gave the first microcredit programs funding in America. It always works. Now, can it make a
difference? It depends on whether they're concentrated enough. I think in Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank and others
have been giving money now for 30 years so that the volume of loans is so great now, I think it's making a measurable
contribution to the economy.”).
87 The micro-credit model thrives abroad. When the World Bank conducted a comprehensive report about financial
inclusion worldwide, they concluded that: Despite best efforts, it seems likely that provision of some financial services to
the very poor may require subsidies. Generally speaking, the use of subsidies in microcredit can dull the incentive for
innovative new technologies in expanding access, with counterproductive long-term repercussions for the poor. Besides,
evidence suggests that for poor households credit is not the only—or in many cases, the principal—financial service they
need. For example, in order to participate in the modern market economy even the poor need—but often cannot
access—reliable, inexpensive, and suitable savings and payments products. Subsidies may sometimes be better spent on
establishing savings and payment products appropriate to the poor. See WORLD BANK, FINANCE FOR ALL?: POLICIES
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provides subsidies and tax credits for “development banks” and to lend in “underdeveloped”
regions and communities. The Fund has suffered severe cuts, but there are currently 950 CDFIs in
the United States that operate in rural and urban communities. 88 The CDFI coalition describes their
banks as “private-sector, financial intermediaries with community development as their primary
mission.” 89 Though there are several models of development banks “all are market-driven, locallycontrolled, private-sector organizations.” The banks focus on a “double bottom line: economic gains
and contributions to [the] local communities.” 90 What distinguishes CDFIs from mainstream banks
is their focus on financial inclusion, which the coalition describes as “rebuilding disinvested
communities and making loans to people with limited or poor credit histories.” The method these
banks use to increase access to credit is to “adapt lending guidelines to the needs of borrowers; to
accept unconventional collateral for loans; and to provide education, training, and assistance to
potential borrowers.” 91
There are several other subsidy-based financial inclusion models, including the BankOn
initiative administered through community partnerships. 92 Historically, there were charitable
organizations and churches that provided credit to the poor. Pawn shops had charitable origins both
in the United States and in Europe. 93 Today, there are some churches and community groups that
offer small loans to members of the community. 94 These loans are low interest and subsidized by the
community or donations. 95 Kiva is a large internet-based micro-credit organization that runs on
charitable donations that make microloans. 96
Another iteration of the subsidy model includes regulatory attempts to cajole banks to lend
to these communities at a loss. This is not a direct act of charity, but an implicit subsidy. The subsidy
is not apparent, but the regulator is relying on the bank’s inherent subsidies and persuading bankers
to pass them on to customers they would not otherwise approach. The CRA, The FDIC Small
Dollar Pilot, and the BankOn initiatives can fit into this model. 97 The CRA is decried as an unjust
(2008); see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 31;
Post & Wilson, supra note 83.
88 See CDFI COALITION, http://cdfi.org/what-are-cdfis/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See generally BANKON, http://joinbankon.org/about/ (“The CFE Fund’s National Bank On platform supports local
coalition and financial institution efforts to connect consumers to safe, affordable bank accounts.”). BankOn initiatives
are financial access programs that focus on providing free or low-cost banking products, as well as financial education
and financial counseling, to unbanked and underbanked residents in local cities. Id. These initiatives partner with other
mainstream financial institutions and programs to embed financial empowerment strategies into local government
infrastructure. Id.
93 Marieke Bos et al., The Pawn Industry and Its Customers: The United States and Europe (Vand. L. and Econ., Working Paper
No. 12-26, 2012) (“As humankind’s oldest financial institution, pawnbroking has served the financial needs of lowincome families for centuries.”).
94 Caplan, supra note 73 (noting the San Francisco-based Low Income Investment Fund (“LIIF”) “makes over $100
million in loans and grants . . . to build infrastructure and finance projects in four areas: child care, education, housing,
and policy.”); see also Jon McNamara, Churches Issue Low Cost Loans and Assist With Predatory Lenders, FAITH FOR JUST
LENDING, https://www.needhelppayingbills.com/html/loans_from_churches.html (describing Faith for Just Lending
organization made up of several churches that provide loans and financial counseling to community members).
95 McNamara, supra note 91.
96 See generally KIVA, HTTPS://WWW.KIVA.ORG/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
97 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America’s Banking System: The Origins and Future of the Current Crisis, 69
WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 775 (1991) (explaining that the cheaper, federally insured deposits can be used to fund
increasingly risky investments); Michael S. Barr, Modes of Credit Market Regulation, in BUILDING ASSETS, BUILDING
AND PITFALLS IN EXPANDING ACCESS
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subsidy by its opponents. 98 This is a charge that the bill’s sponsors and proponents would likely
agree with—the difference between the two camps is whether the subsidy is justified or not. 99
Common Traits
Though advocates for each of these financial inclusion methods believe that they differ
significantly from each other, these three different models of providing access to credit are built on
similar theoretical understandings of financial markets and the people that fall outside of them. The
shared assumptions are the following:
First, they assume that the poor require different products and services that those that are
already “financially included.” These models assume that there are natural barriers that separate the
financially excluded from normal credit markets. These initiatives are often coupled with financial
education or literacy or the products are designed to help their users overcome behavioral quirks
that are assumed to create barriers to the “normal credit market.” Indeed, financial inclusion is
practically synonymous with financial education or financial literacy. In nearly every method
discussed above, the new product or micro-loan is coupled with financial education to help the
borrower. These products either pathologize the poor—and assume that their poverty was created
by individual choices-or they at least treat their state of poverty or financial exclusion as a trait
inherent in the excluded borrower. In other words, the problem of the gap is inherent in those
outside the circle or at least the gap is created by a different trait of the excluded that makes them
distinct from the norm.
Second, the product or subsidy providing credit is based on a different credit product or
model than the credit products internal to the mainstream credit system. Financial inclusion includes
products or services that are innovative, unique, or different from those inside the circle. Based in
part on the assumption outlined above, financial products aimed at inclusion are different in form,
function and purpose than “normal credit mechanisms.” Microcredit, for example, is a much smaller
loan than regular loans intended to start a small businesses. Peer to Peer lending and other fintech
products like mobile banking are intended to overcome different barriers than those presented by
regular consumers. If the inside of the credit markets are business loans, home loans, student loans,
the credit outside are microloans for businesses, payday loans for emergencies, or consumer loans.
Of course, fintech products are also marketed to the population at large, but to the extent fintech
firms focus on financial inclusion the product is usually seen as new or different from historic credit
markets. The new product or loan attempts to increase access to credit because it is distinct from the
traditional credit market.
CREDIT: CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES (Nicolas Retsinas & Eric Belsky eds., 2005) (introducing
five credit market and subsidy programs); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An
Economic Analysis, 79 VA L. REV. 291, 296 (1993).
98 Kenneth Jones & Barry Koltach, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and Implications for Financial Modernization, 12
FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 15 (1999) (suggesting if banks receive any net subsidy at all from federal safety net, it is small);
Macey & Miller, supra note 94 (suggesting the goal of subsidizing poor or disadvantaged citizens can be better
accomplished by direct subsidy programs).
99 Compare Macy & Miller, supra note 94, with Michael S. Barr, supra note 11, at 521. Senator William Proxmire, the
sponsor of both the CRA and the ECOA, believed that banks had public obligations and thus he was comfortable
asking them to extend their services to the excluded even if it came as a cost. See WARREN L. DENNIS, THE COMMUNITY
RE-INVESTMENT ACT OF 1977 (1978).
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Finally, except for the gap-filling model, these inclusion products do little to probe, change,
or even examine the inner core of credit system. It is simply assumed that they are not part of the
“normal” credit system. The gap-filling model come closest to an examination of core credit
markets, but only on the surface by patching up discrimination. The inner circle of credit is hardly
even discussed when policymakers focus on financial inclusion. Microcredit is not credit that
emanates from or has anything to do with the inner circle. It operates outside of and apart from the
core. Likewise, fintech, P2P lending and blockchain are purposefully non-bank credit. It is taken for
granted that some consumers are simply not being served by the mainstream credit market and a
different market is created for these customers. In sum, when we talk about financial services
outside of the central core, we talk about financial inclusion and increasing access to credit through
products or subsidies that are apart from the dominant credit system.
This article focuses on this last point as the central problem with the rhetoric of financial
inclusion. As Part II shows, the mainstream credit market, the central circle from which the poor are
excluded, is operated essentially by the federal government.
PART II
This section looks at the credit at the center of the circle, or the “dominant,” “mainstream,”
or “normal” credit market. There are two distinct services that banks provide: payments and credit.
When discussing financial inclusion, regulators, industry advocates and commentators often lump
both services together. This section will describe the two components of financial inclusion-payments and credit—and demonstrate their differences and similarities. Those excluded from the
payments portion of the financial sector are those who are unbanked or “underbanked” and must use
AFS products for transactions include cashing checks or the exchange and transmission of money.
Access to credit usually means being eligible for and receiving credit from the banking system. Access
to credit is a nebulous term because there are many forms of credit with varying degrees of
accessibility. Surely, the ability to qualify for a standard mortgage loan differs from high-priced
subprime credit or a payday loan. The inner circle of credit, referenced above, usually covers the
standard loans of the middle class—these are loans that banks provide including mortgage loans,
student loans, and revolving credit offered by credit cards. These two separate branches of financial
inclusion will be discussed below.
The bulk of payments and credit services and resources are managed and designed by federal
government agencies or laws. Drawing on the concentric circle representations in Part I, the inner
circle of payments and credit services are those provided by banks to the middle class. Because
banks are heavily subsidized and supported by federal agencies and credit programs, the services at
the top of the chart are the least costly for customers. Outside the circle is the domains of markets,
subsidies, or of charity. The below chart depicts the trajectory from the core of the circle of
mainstream credit to the outside. As illustrated, the credit and payments services at the top (which
are the inner core of the circle) are usually less costly (as measured by fees and interest) than those at
the bottom. More crucially, those at the top are more connected to public entities than those at the
bottom. In other words, the public provisioning and subsidy decreases from top to bottom—or
from mainstream credit to the periphery (the realm of financial inclusion.)
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Payments
The Federal Reserve is the primary regulator of the payments system and also operates the
largest payments processing system. 100 Historically, the federal reserve created and operated a check
clearing system where banks would settle their balances of transfer. 101 If a bank in Connecticut owed
a bank in New York $300 and the New York bank owed the Connecticut bank $200, the
Connecticut bank would simply transfer $100 through the central bank clearinghouses where the
accounts would be settled. According to the textbook, Payments Systems in the U.S.: A Guide for the
Payments Professional, “the Federal Reserve Bank system, formed in the early 20th century, played an
important role by requiring its member banks throughout the country to accept checks for deposit at
par. This meant that the deposit bank would credit its customer with ‘one hundred cents on the
dollar’ rather than some lesser percentage. The Fed’s requirement, coupled with the development of
clearing houses across the country, transformed checking into a true national payments system. 102
BENSON, supra note 99 (“In the United States, the primary issuer of payments regulations is the Federal Reserve
Board.”); Adam J. Levitin, Public-Private Competition in Payments: The Role of the Federal Reserve 3 (Geo. L. & Econ., Working
Paper No. 1420061) (noting that the Federal Reserve system “occupies a central place in the nation’s payment systems,
both as a regulator and as a market participant.”).
101 Levitin, supra note 97, at 4.
102 BENSON, supra note 99.
100
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Today, checks are not literally exchanged in a central location. These exchanges can be
executed through an electronic central clearing system. 103 Money is still sent and exchanged through
the electronic network operated and overseen by the federal reserve. 104 Even as money is no longer
tangible and the majority of transactions are digital, every time money is sent or received in the
economy, it must pass through a central clearinghouse. 105 Only an officially chartered bank or credit
card company has access to this payments system. 106 In other words, though the majority of
transactions are processed by a public agency, only private banks and credit card issuers are given a
charter to use it. 107 This protects the payments processing system from risks and frauds, but it also
presents barriers for the unbanked.
The payments systems operate behind the scenes of daily consumer transactions. A
customer will swipe a credit or debit card, write a check, or even use an app like Venmo or Square
without realizing that she is using the bank-mediated payments system that is processing the
transaction. Though certain fintech apps present themselves as non-banks, their payments
transactions still operate through a bank. 108 When a consumer downloads the Venmo app on their
smartphone and before the app enables them to do “mobile banking,” they must link their bank
account to the service. 109 The bank service is hidden in this process and the central bank clearing
103 Id. (largest of these is the ACH clearing house); Levitin, supra note 97, at 5 (“The Fed is the dominant clearinghouse
operation, with over 70% of the domestic market share as recently as 2002.”).
104 BENSON, supra note 99.
105 Id.
106 Anatoli Kuprianov, The Monetary Control Act and the Role of the Federal Reserve in the Interbank Clearing Market, 71 ECON. L.
REV. 23, 26 (1985) (noting“banks that were not members of the Federal Reserve System were required to maintain
accounts with member banks for purposes of settlement.”).
107 The Federal Reserve operates the Automated Clearinghouse (“ACH”), which provides an electronic means to
exchange debit and credit entries between depository institutions to settle customer transactions and is the Federal
Reserve’s primary electronic payment system. The ACH processes approximately three-quarters of all electronic
payments in the U.S., including recurring mortgage payments, utility bills, payroll direct deposits, Social Security
disbursements, and large inter-bank transfers. See generally FED. RES. BANK OF S.F.,
https://www.frbsf.org/education/teacher-resources/what-is-the-fed/payment-services/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
108 Internet platforms like Venmo and PayPal are most commonly used for person-to-person, business-to-customer, and
business-to-business transactions. Venmo and PayPal users initiate payments or charges with other users whose balances
are either credited or debited on the platform ledger (the user’s Venmo or PayPal profile balance). PayPal/Venmo
delivers the transaction information to the users’ banks through the ACH system and the bank delivers the same
information to the ACH network operator – the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve electronically processes the
transaction and both the banks and PayPal/Venmo users are notified of the transaction clearance. As of December
2013, Venmo has operated as a subsidiary of PayPal. See Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69
ALA. L. REV. 781 (2018); PAYPAL,
https://www.paypalobjects.com/en_US/vhelp/paypalmanager_help/about_ach_payments.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2020).
109 In fact, most of these services use a few specialty banks called ILCs that have access to the payments system due to a
legislative loophole/ ILCs, or Industrial Loan Companies, operate similarly to banks and have access to the Federal
Reserve ACH payments system, but are not subject to oversight by Fed examiners. ILCs also benefit from federal
deposit insurance and the Federal Reserve’s discount window and in exchange, ILCs must conform to federal safety and
soundness and consumer protection laws. However, unlike traditional banks, ILCs have no limits on their size or the
activities they may conduct, which, in cases like WebBank, can include general commercial activities. Julie Stackhouse,
Fintech Interest in Industrial Loan Company Charters: Spurring the Growth of a New Shadow Banking System?, FED. RES. BANK OF
ST. LOUIS (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2017/october/fintech-interest-industrial-loancompany-charters-spurring-new-shadow-banking-system. Non-bank payments system providers like PayPal are able to
avoid federal regulation because they only provide a medium through which payments and charges originate, but they do
not actually process transactions. After a PayPal user originates a transaction, PayPal delivers the transaction information
to the user’s bank where the transaction is actually processed. PayPal and similar non-bank platforms thereby avoid
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system is rendered invisible. Most people are not aware this is happening—such that the
entrepreneurs of these services often mistakenly boast that they are making banks obsolete. 110 Yet
the traditional banking system that the edgy new apps are meant to supplant is actually providing the
background access, the rails on which the fintech train can run.
The ubiquity of the central bank’s payments system only becomes apparent when you
consider how people outside of the banking system engage with the economy. In the case of
individuals without bank accounts, they must pay fees to cash checks or purchase debit cards and
without bank accounts, mobile apps are unavailable. 111 Perhaps a better illustration of the costs of
being left out of the payments system is in the case of an entire industry that is unable to access the
payments system: marijuana distribution.
The Marijuana businesses makes the prominence and centrality of the federal payments
system clear because it is the only business sanctioned by a few states but not by the Federal
government. Marijuana businesses operate legally in several states, but banks all operate on a federal
reserve payment system and with FDIC insurance. All banks and payments providers rely on the
federal systems for payments processing. 112 In the case of marijuana dispensaries, the federal
government has not legalized marijuana and thus banking regulators have not allowed banks to deal
with those “illegal businesses.” 113 Banks cannot interact with marijuana businesses and maintain
their FDIC insurance coverage. 114 Thus, marijuana dispensaries must deal in cash. 115 They cannot
process credit cards, debit cards or checks from customers or pay for goods, rent, or do any
transactions whatsoever, without dealing with the banking system. 116 Cash is costly and dangerous
federal regulation under the BSCA. Christopher Paridon, New Changes and Challenges: Non-banks in the Payments System,
A.B.A. BANKING L. COMM. J. 2-3 (2007).
110 See, e.g., Tony Ravals, Council Post: How Banks Can Stay Relevant in the Digital Age, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/01/16/how-banks-can-stay-relevant-in-the-digitalage/#5853d3365004 (noting “fintech startups [] aim to make traditional banks obsolete.”); Kate Rooney, Square Stumbles
Into the Banking Business, CNBC (May 18, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/18/square-stumbles-into-the-bankingbusiness.html (explaining Cash App has been used like a bank account for customers, and that CEO Jack Dorsey
expects the trend to grow for the un-banked).
111 Unbanked or underbanked customers who use alternative financial services for basic banking services incur
substantial fees, including check cashing at a 1.5% to 3.5% face value charge. To access short-term, low value credit,
underserved customers often turn to payday lenders for paycheck or tax return anticipation loans with effective APRs
over 470%. JULIA S. CHENEY, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA., PAYMENT CARDS AND THE UNBANKED: PROSPECTS AND
CHALLENGES- CONFERENCE SUMMARY (2005).
112 Julie Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597 (2015); Erin Mundahl, Federal Banking Law
Still Keeps Budding Cannabis Industry from Opening Accounts, INSIDE SOURCES (May 11, 2018),
https://www.insidesources.com/federal-banking-law-still-keeps-budding-cannabis-industry-from-opening-accounts/.
113 JAMES M. COLE, U.S. DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM: GUIDANCE REGARDING
MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT (2013).
114 Moises Gail-Velazquez, Changes Needed to Protect Banking and Financial Services When Dealing With the Marijuana Industry,
LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR J. (2016).
115 Robb Mandelbaum, Where Pot Entrepreneurs Go When the Banks Just Say No, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/magazine/where-pot-entrepreneurs-go-when-the-banks-just-say-no.html.
116 It is still illegal to use a credit card to purchase marijuana directly because credit card carriers are intertwined with
federally insured bank accounts and the Federal Reserve payments system. However, some marijuana vendors have
developed work arounds that enable customers to use their credit cards to purchase digital credits, coins, or tokens that
can then be exchanged as value for marijuana products—imagine cashing in game tokens or tickets at the arcade for a
giant teddy bear—without breaking federal drug laws or implicating their banks in drug-related money laundering
violations. Jenny Bloom, New App Makes Paying for Weed With Credit Cards a Reality, OR. CANNABIS CONNECTION (Sept.
25, 2017), https://www.occnewspaper.com/new-app-makes-paying-for-weed-with-credit-cards-a-reality/; Nathaniel
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and many dispensaries have hired armed guards and purchased expensive safes. 117 In contrast,
businesses and individuals with a bank account can use credit cards, debit cards, and mobile apps
without cost.
Only banks and their customers have access to the payments systems, but banks are private
businesses seeking profits and thus will not provide bank accounts at a cost. Maintaining simple
checking or savings accounts cost banks money. They must hire staff, pay for buildings, update
technology, build ATM’s, send monthly statements. A simple bank account costs a bank around
$250 every year. 118 If there is too little money in an account, the profits are low or non-existent.
Simple business math suggests that if a product (like a small account) is not profitable, it should be
avoided--which is exactly what banks do. Consumers that are deemed unprofitable are either
rejected by the bank outright or repelled by punishing fees. The most prevalent fee on small
accounts are overdraft fees, which make up 75% of all bank fees. 119 These costs are born primarily
by the poor—90% of the fees are paid by 10% of the customers. A 2014 report studied the annual
costs of checking accounts at large banks among five categories of spenders and found that by far,
the people in the lowest category, or the “cash strapped” category, paid the most to use a checking
account. 120 The FDIC has noted that overdraft fees, service charges, and minimum balance
requirements are among the top reasons people do not open bank accounts. 121 Those with small
means are hearing the banks’ message loud and clear. There are approximately [ ] million Americans
who do not have a bank account or access to traditional financial services. 122
Those without a bank account pay the most for payments services. Cashing a paycheck alone
costs between 5 to 10% of her paycheck. 123 Not having a bank account reduces take-home pay and

Popper, As Marijuana Sales Grow, Start-Ups Step In for Wary Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/business/dealbook/as-marijuana-sales-grow-start-ups-step-in-for-warybanks.html?_r=0.
117 Julie Turkewitz, Veterans Back on Patrol, This Time to Protect Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/us/veterans-back-on-patrol-this-time-to-protect-marijuana.html.
118 Marcie Geffner, Bank Account Costs $250, BANKRATE (Jul. 26, 2010),
http://www.bankrate.com/financing/banking/bank-account-costs-250/ (“In fact, the ABA says, the annual cost of a
checking account is actually $250 to $300.”). The American Bankers Association claims that the cost of opening an
account runs between $150 and $200 and the annual cost of maintaining an account runs between $250 and $300. The
American Bankers Association catalogues the costs of maintaining an account: “these costs reflect the expense of
processing transactions, providing monthly statements, investing in payment system technology and software, paying the
cost of tellers, ATMs, and online banking, staffing call centers, complying with countless regulations, ensuring privacy
and data protection, and preventing fraud and covering fraud losses.” Ibid.
119 Mark Maremont & Tom McGinty, Why Banks at Wal-Mart Are Among America’s Top Fee Collectors, WALL ST. J. (May 11,
2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304734304579515730198367754?KEYWORDS=maremont&
mg=reno64-wsj.
120 Megan Crepeau, Less Money, Pricier Banking, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 8, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-high-cost-for-the-poor-of-using-a-bank.
121 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., ADDENDUM TO THE 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS: USE OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SERVICE (2013). Michael Barr’s survey results from
his book, No Slack shows that when the unbanked are asked what changes to bank accounts would induce them to open
an account, 29% of respondents said lower fees, 20% convenience, 10% get money faster, 14% lower minimum balance,
16% less confusing fees, and 11% nothing. BARR, supra note 2, at 32.
122 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 FDIC SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2018)
(estimating the number of unbanked and underbanked individuals in the U.S.).
123 BARR, supra note 2, at 3.
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makes it difficult for families to save and establish a credit history. 124 In 2017, the unbanked spent a
total of $173 billion on financial transactions alone. 125 It is this group of people, left out of the
banks’ payment infrastructure, that are the target of financial inclusion efforts.
Credit:
In the credit market, the public/private continuum is much more pronounced. The credit
market is heavily subsidized by the federal government and the private non-bank market is very
expensive. 126 Each aspect of banking: deposits, loans, and simple financial transactions relies on a
robust network of government support. Banks can take and lend customer deposits and engage in
fractional reserve lending and money creation because customer deposits are insured by the FDIC.
Unlike all other corporations, banks pay virtually nothing for their funding (customer deposits)
because of this federal government. 127 Federal deposit insurance provided by the FDIC reduces the
risk and costs associated with fractional reserve lending with the use of “other people’s money.” 128
Before the days of FDIC insurance, any real or perceived sign of bank failure would spook
depositors who would “run” the bank leading to its quick at catastrophic failure. Today, banks can
safely operate using liquidity from customer deposits (among other sources of funds) without a
threat of a run thanks to the FDIC guarantees. Banks pay virtually nothing for customer deposits (a
source of bank credit) and thus enjoy the lowest cost liquidity option available on the market—all
thanks to federal programs. 129 And when the FDIC fund goes into the red—as it did in 2008—these
deposits are backstopped by the full faith and credit of the US Treasury. These explicit guarantees
calmed markets even during a system-wide loss of trust. 130 Even with guaranteed deposits, banks still

Michael S. Barr, An Inclusive, Progressive National Savings and Financial Services Policy, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 164, 164
(2007).
125 CTR FOR FIN. SERVS.’ INNOVATION, 2017 FINANCIALLY UNDERSERVED MARKET SIZE STUDY 4 (2017).
126 See Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L. J. 483, 494 (2013) (“This tendency has
created two banking systems in America: a government subsidized, mainstream banking system for the rich and an
unregulated, alternative banking system for the poor.”).
127 Banks do pay into the FDIC insurance fund through premiums, but most scholars agree that the premiums are
underpriced. Furthermore, it is not just the actual funds that are paid out in the event of a failure that is of importance
here. It is the fact that bank deposits are backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government making them a
safe repository for their customers’ funds. “Until the early 1990s, the FDIC levied flat-rate insurance premiums on banks
as a function of deposits, but not the banks’ risk. In 1991 the FDICIA required that the FDIC introduce risk-based
premiums. However, to date, the range of premiums is much narrower than the range of risk exposures of the FDIC to
individual bank failures. Under the Deposit Insurance Funding Act of 1996, when the FDIC reserve fund exceeds 1.25
percent of deposits, the “safest” of banks pay no deposit insurance premium meaning that recently more than 90 % of
banks holding over 90% of total bank assets paid NO premiums.” Joe Peek & James A. Wilcox, The Fall and Rise of
Banking Safety Net Subsides, in TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 177-78 (Benton
E. Gup ed., 2004).
128 Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1277, 1283 (1989)
(explaining banks benefit from deposit insurance because it allows them to take greater risks).
129 Wolf Ritcher, Banks are vying for deposits – and the fight could mark a shifting industry, Business Insider (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/banks-are-vying-for-deposits-and-the-fight-marks-a-shifting-industry-2018-4
(“Deposits are a crucial and very cheap source of funding for banks, which make money by lending to their customers at
higher rates than their cost of funding.”)
130 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CRISIS AND RESPONSE: AN FDIC HISTORY, 2008-2013 (2017); Jonathan D. Rose, OldFashioned Deposit Runs, in FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES 2015-111 (2015).
124
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face liquidity crises. In those scenarios, the Fed’s discount window provides banks emergency loans
at 0.5% higher than the Federal Funds rate, which is below market rate. 131
On the asset side, most mortgages and student loans are guaranteed, bundled, or subsidized
by the FHA or the Government Sponsored Entities (GSE’s) Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae,
and Sallie Mae. 132 The majority of home loans 133 and student loans 134 are insured by and sold to the
federal government. The Department of Education issues most student loans—$1.2 Trillion of a
total of $1.6 Trillion student loan market are direct loans from the U.S. government. 135 The Dept. of
Education originates the loans, holds the note, and then contracts with third party servicers who
collect on the contracts. The Treasury collects the payments from borrowers and is involved in
some collection practices such as tax refund offsets and wage garnishments. This type of lending,
unlike mortgage lending, is a direct budget line item on the Treasury’s balance sheet. The credit line
is created by the federal government, lent to students, and then repayments flow back into the
Federal Government’s coffers. 136
These GSE’s purchase almost every mortgage and student loan in the country and resell
them to investors. Before 2008, GSEs enjoyed the implicit backing of the Federal Government, but
since 2008 they have been under direct conservatorship and thus all standard student and mortgage
loans are guaranteed by the Federal government. 137 Thus, the majority of mortgage and student
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., MONETARY POLICY,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2015); Kimberly Amadeo, Federal
Reserve Discount Window and How It Works, BALANCE (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/federal-reservediscount-window-3305923.
132 Sallie Mae ceased being a GSE, and became fully privatized, when Congress terminated its charter on December 29,
2004. At that point, the GSE became SLM Corporation, “a fully private sector corporation.” PHILLIP QUINN ET AL.,
U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., OFFICE OF SALLIE MAE OVERSIGHT, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PRIVATIZATION OF SALLIE
MAE 1 (2006). A table on page 3 of the above Treasury report distinguishes the former GSE-Sallie Mae from the fully
privatized SLM corporation. Notable differences include: (1) the GSE’s charter was created by an act of Congress; (2)
the President appointed the GSE’s board members; (3) the GSE could borrow up to $1billion from the Treasury,
whereas the SLM corporation cannot borrow from the Treasury; (4) the GSE’s debt was eligible for federal open market
purchases; (5) the GSE was exempt from SEC registration and financial and other filings with the SEC; and (6) the GSE
was exempted from federal, state, and local income taxes. Id. at 3.
133 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE SECONDARY
MORTGAGE MARKET ix (2010). (“[T]wo GSEs owned or guaranteed roughly half of all outstanding mortgages in the
United States . . . .”).
134 See Kelly D. Edmiston et al., Student Loans: Overview and Issues (Update) 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City
Research, Working Paper No. 12-05, 2013); Laura J. Feiveson et al., Student Loan Debt and Aggregate Consumption Growth,
FED. RES. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/student-loan-debt-and-aggregateconsumption-growth-20180221.htm (“The federal government guarantees more than 90 percent of outstanding student
loan debt . . . .”).
135 Student Borrower Protection Center, Presentation at the UC Irvine School of Law Student Loan Law Initiative’s
Colloquium on Student Loan Law (Oct. 4, 2019) (on file with author).
136 JULIE MARGETTA MORGAN, THE ROOSEVELT INST., WHO PAYS? HOW INDUSTRY INSIDERS RIG THE STUDENT
LOAN SYSTEM—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2018). Derivative Sovereign Immunity: Lessons from the Federal Student Loan
Program by Julie Margetta Morgan; Collecting in the Government’s Name: A Case Study for Examining Contractor
Liability under the FDCPA by Persis Yu; Preemption of State Regulations by Rebecca Maurer; Student Loan Servicers
and the Preemption Question: Why Policymakers Should Stop Worrying and Learn to Love State Law by Suzanne
Martindale and Michael Pierce; The Miseducation of Ann Chae: Reexamining the Ninth Circuit’s Approach to
Preemption in Chae v. SLM Corporation by Benjamin Roesch; Supremacy, Inc. by David Rubenstein.
137 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were spun off of the federal government and privatized, which meant that they were
run by a board of shareholders. It did not mean that they operated in normal markets. The market still treated them like
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loans issued by banks are essentially risk free. The banks and investors are paid interest rates by
borrowers even though GSEs protect lenders from default. GSEs enable banks to lend
exponentially more loans than what their customer deposits would allow. At the crux of our banking
system, then, is a state-enabled credit system.
Deposits, loans—assets and liabilities—all supported by the Federal Government. And that’s
just the tip of the iceberg. None of this takes into account the government bailout, the staggering
magnitude of which went on full display after the 2008 financial crisis. Using its 13(3) emergency
lending powers, the federal government bailed out a failing banking industry with over a trillion
dollars of equity infusions, loans, guarantees, asset purchases, and other forms of financial
support. 138 The help came on very favorable terms with interest rates not available on the market.
The arrangement was so good that the CEO of one of the largest bailed out banks, upon seeing the
terms of the deal, remarked, “This is very cheap credit!” 139
Even the last decade of monetary policy has been designed to “prime the pump” and flood
bank balance sheets with cheap funds in order to induce more lending on their part. In other words,
the Federal Reserve’s stimulus programs are premised on the model of banks as credit
intermediaries. The money, created through the Federal Reserve programs, are supposed to pass
through banks and to be used to lend to the market. Yet there is no requirement that the banks must
lend these funds and there is evidence that the main result of these extraordinary measures has been
to boost bank profitability. 140After three rounds of QE, the Fed is still holding over four trillion
dollars in bank assets.
Another less well-known example of monetary policy is Interest On Excess Reserves
(“IOER”). In a payment that seems to violate what people may assume to be the laws of the market
and basic common sense, the Federal Reserve pays billions of dollars in interest to banks on their
reserves. 141 In just one year, the Federal Reserve paid about $7 billion in interest to commercial
banks, including more than $100 million to Goldman Sachs and more than $900 million to
JPMorgan Chase.” The point of this payment is that it will “pass through” the banks to the
depositor, but the IOER is in fact not being passed on but being absorbed by the bank as profits,
government entities, meaning, that they did not contemplate their failure. When they did fail because of the excessive
risks their managers took, the government bailed them out without flinching. See id.
138 The actual amount of the bailout is difficult to determine because much of it was in guarantees. The special inspector
general for TARP estimated a total potential support package of $23.7 trillion, or over 150 percent of the U.S. GDP.
However, many of these guarantees were never used. See Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL
STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN, 174 (2010).
139 Vikram Pandit, CEO of Citigroup, Quoted in DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE
GREAT PANIC 239 (2009).
140 Juan A. Montecino & Gerald Epstein, Have Large Scale Asset Purchases Increased Bank Profits? 4–19 (Inst. Of New Econ.
Thinking, Working Paper No. 5, 2019).
141 Due to the massive amounts of money created by QE, bank reserves swelled to over $1.7 trillion as of October 2018.
This overage is called excess reserves and even though it was created by the federal reserve, banks earn interest on these
reserves. These reserves comprise a substantial portion of the nation’s monetary base. The Federal Reserve is using this
payment, called an “administered rate” as its primary monetary policy tool post QE. See FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
REQUIRED RESERVES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS (Nov. 8, 2018), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/REQRESNS.
Banks are required to hold roughly 10% of their deposits in reserves at the central bank. The required reserves on just
customer deposits would equal roughly $189 billion. See Walker F. Todd, The Problem of Excess Reserves, Then and Now,
(Levy Econ. Inst. Of Bard C., Working Paper No. 763, 2013) (Put another way, before August 2007, the Fed’s reserve
account was 5.1% of the monetary base, and in mid-2013.

27
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3607461

and thereby increasing inequality. 142 Because excess reserves pay higher interest than Treasury bills,
there is no reason banks would pass up a risk-free, high-interest opportunity. Each dollar held on
reserve is a dollar not lent for real estate, infrastructure, or business operations in the American
economy. 143
It has been called monetary policy, but it can more accurately be described as credit policy.
Through asset purchases, credit, guarantees, and reserves, the Federal Reserve controls the amount
of money circulating in the economy. The Federal Reserve can and has increased the supply of
money and credit as it has done through QE. 144 It has done so by flushing banks with money with
the hope that they will lend the surplus. Trillions of dollars of investments and loans have been
pumped into the banking system over the last decade. 145
Thus, money, like credit, is a public good and its creation, supply, and stability is a function
of the US Treasury in coordination with the Federal Reserve. 146 In an abstract sense, money is a
This policy, which was meant to encourage lending by banks has turned into a subsidy that in fact discourages lending
because banks can earn more by “lending” customer deposits to the Federal Reserve than they can pursuing consumer
or business loans. Excess funds can be rolled over at no cost and liquidated on the same day, making excess reserves
more attractive than lending. Darrell Duffie & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Passthrough Efficiency in the Fed’s New Monetary Policy
Setting, KAN. CITY FED. RES. SYMP. (Sept. 2016); Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure 25-36, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (2018).
143 Todd suggests that the Federal Reserve sell about $180 billion in mortgage-backed securities or longer maturity
Treasury securities per year in order to prevent future inflation. See Todd, supra note 138, at 15-16.
144 After reducing interest rates to virtually 0% did not spur a revival of the banking sector, the Federal Reserve began to
pump money into the economy through three rounds of Quantitative Easing (“QE”). The Federal Reserve created
money by buying securities, like government bonds, from banks. The purpose was to spur bank lending by increasing
the supply of money (even at the risk of inflation) and by the reduction of risk that was making banks overly cautious.
These purchases were made with electronic cash that did not exist before and once created, increased the total bank
reserves by the quantity of assets purchased—thus “quantitative” easing. The Federal Reserve began QE in 2008 with
the purchase of $800 billion in bank debt, Treasury notes, and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) from Reserve member
banks. QE was essentially a transfer of risk from bank balance sheets to the central bank’s balance sheets. In December
2013, the Federal Reserve announced it would wind down its QE purchases because the unemployment rate was at 7%,
inflation had not risen above 2%, and national GDP growth was nearly 3%. After three rounds of QE, the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet grew to over $4.473 trillion in May 2017. The Fed still holds over $3.98 trillion in assets on its
balance sheets due to its QE purchases. Moreover, QE generated around $700 billion in profits for the Federal Reserve.
Quantitative Easing is essentially the central bank’s purchase of public debt—the central bank is lending to the federal
government. However, the goal of QE is not to help aid government spending, but the goal has been described as
pushing bank lending. In other words, the federal reserve bought public debt in order to lower the costs of credit by
private lenders to private borrowers. See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, What is Quantitative Easing, and How Has It
Been Used?, ON THE ECON. BLOG (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-theeconomy/2017/november/quantitative-easing-how-used. Remarkably, the current Fed balance sheet total of $3.98
trillion is down a high of over $4.5 trillion in January 2015. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm; Jon Sindrew, Central-Ban Rescues Prove Profitable,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/central-bank-rescues-prove-profitable-1474380387; Mike
KONZCAL & J.W. MASON, THE ROOSEVELT INST., A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE FEDERAL RESERVE: EXPANDING THE
MONETARY POLICY TOOLKIT (2017).
145 William Greider, Unusual and Exigent: How the Fed Can Jump-Start the Real Economy, LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD C.
(2013).
146 Morgan Ricks et al., A Public Option for Bank Accounts (Or Central Banking for All) (UC Hastings, Research Paper No.
287, 2018); James Tobin, The Case for Preserving Regulatory Distinctions, in RESTRUCTURING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 167,
172 (1987) (“I think the government should make available to the public a medium with the convenience of deposits and
the safety of currency, essentially currency on deposit, transferable in any amount by check or other order . . . . The
Federal Reserve Banks themselves could offer such deposits.”); See also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic
Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Non-market Allocations, in ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC
142
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credit instrument from the central bank to the holders of money. The Federal Reserve’s monetary
policy can increase or decrease the monetary supply, which affects the amount of credit available. 147
When the Federal Reserve pays banks on their reserves or buys their assets through QE, they are
creating new money that did not exist previously.
Viewed from this lens, it was the policies and actions of public agencies like the Treasury and
the Federal Reserve that determined the scope and shape of the circle of credit, including who was
left outside. The lending determinations of the government sponsored entities and the legislatures
that create their mandates determine the amount of available credit, its costs and availability. In my
simplistic diagram, policy determines the size of the circle. These credit products are not just abetted
by government agencies; they are created by them. The credit market at the center of the circle is
guaranteed by government agencies. Even more crucially, the types of loans the government will
guarantee and the kinds of borrowers that are eligible for the loan are determined through public
policy. The federal government has $1.24 trillion in direct loan programs and $2.37 trillion in loans it
guarantees—all in mortgage and student loans. 148 These major credit programs are centered around
both student loans and mortgages through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), each
representing more than a trillion dollars of loans. 149 Through democratic decision-making and
legislative action, several types of loans have been promoted by public policy, including student
loans, home loans, and certain small business loans. Republicans and Democrats over the last
Century have championed a variety of policies promoting and subsidizing home ownership and
college education. Beginning with President Hoover up to President Trump with notable programs
by FDR and George Bush along the way, coordinated efforts by legislatures and federal agencies
have set out to achieve these outcomes. It is difficult to overstate the effect of these longstanding
programs and their effects on American society, including their pernicious side-effects like the
ongoing effects of racial segregation.
The laws and policies of FHA mortgage financing provide an illustrative example of how
policy decisions about what types of loans to guarantee can shape markets. The FHA mortgage
guarantee fund created the modern mortgage market, created the American suburb, and a pattern of
race-based segregation through a program of mortgage guarantees. 150 The FHA was created as part
of the National Housing Act of 1934 and was supplemented and expanded through the 1944
through the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (the GI Bill) administered by the VA. 151 The FHA’s
mortgage guarantee fund, which was backed by the US Treasury, shifted the risk of loan default
EXPENDITURES: THE PPP SYSTEM, 48 J. ECON. COMM. OF CONG. (1969) (“The creation of money is in many respects
an example of a public good.”); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIACS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 19 (6th ed. 2011) (“Money is a public good.”); John Cochrane, Remarks at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (May 16, 2016) (“There’s a few things that government has a natural monopoly in: national
defense, courts, property rights, and I would say money.”).
147 MICHAEL MCLEAY ET AL., MONEY CREATION IN THE MODERN ECONOMY (2014).
148 U.S. MGMT. & BUDGET, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the U. S. Government, 227 (2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/spec.pdf.
149 MIKE KONCZAL & J.W. MASON, A New Direction for the Federal Reserve: Expanding the Monetary Policy Toolkit, THE
ROOSEVELT INST., 45 (2017).
150 Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and International Context, 19 J. ECON. OF
PERSPECTIVES 93, 95 (footnote omitted) (“[T]he government established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to
provide the mortgage insurance necessary for investors to purchase mortgages with confidence.”).
151 Id. at 96 (discussing the creation and effect of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act).
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from private bank lenders to the federal government. 152 By creating a buffer to absorb default risks,
this new government infrastructure opened the floodgates for an unprecedented amount of private
capital to flood mortgage markets. 153 Virtually overnight, mortgage loans became easy, risk-free, and
abundant. “New home construction doubled from 1936 to 1941. In 1936, the FHA had lent half a
billion dollars in guaranteed mortgages. By 1939, they had already issued $4 billion in mortgages and
home improvement loans. Housing starts were 332,000 in 1936 and 619,000 in 1941.” 154 The federal
guarantee fueled a world-wide market in mortgages, created the middle class, and produced a stable
and profitable banking sector. 155 The FHA did not lend money itself, but it created a large insurance
fund backed by the United States Treasury that would guarantee all approved mortgage loans,
shifting the bulk of the risk of loan default from banks to the government. 156 This transformation
was aided along by the new 1938 creation of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or
“Fannie Mae”), also referred to as a Government Sponsored Entities (GSE), which created a
securitized secondary market in mortgage loans. 157
These public credit programs created the modern mortgage market. Federal interventions
unleashed unprecedented levels of private capital investment because they took the risk our of
mortgage lending. Before the interventions of the FHA and the GSE’s, mortgages were hard to
come by, but even when they were available, they were short-term loans of around 5 years and the
home buyer needed up to 50% of a down payment. 158 After the federal government programs, the
mortgage market boomed. Hundreds of thousands of new private banks, thrifts, credit unions and
private non-bank lenders entered the market due to these programs. Private banks issued the
mortgages and private funds invested in secondary mortgage markets and private lenders made
credit decisions and private market shareholders made profits and thus the credit market appeared
to be a private market, but the truth is that without the government programs, the market would not
have existed. This truth was apparent when one focused on the Black neighborhoods where the
FHA refused to guarantee mortgages, as described below. Banks increasingly relied on the protocol
and standards provided by the government agencies that were insuring the mortgages and managing
their resale. Interest rates and terms converged as did the types of borrowers. Banks were much less
likely to take risks on borrowers that did not fit the gold standard, which was white, middle-class,
and male. Yet to call those who qualified for these loans “the middle class” is an evasive and circular
description. Many were blue collar wage workers, but it was precisely through these mortgages that
they became the much-heralded American middle class. 159 These borrowers would not have been
able to buy homes before these reforms; over half of mortgage borrowers earned less than $2,500
per year. 160 After these programs, mortgage loans became far more accessible than they had ever
Id. at 97.
Id.
154 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL
INEQUALITY 17 (2nd ed. 2006).
155 HYMAN, supra note 26, at 53.
156 The federal guarantee revolutionized mortgages because the fund insured 90% of individual home mortgages.
According to Julian Zimmerman, FHA commissioner in the 1950s, when the scheme was first proposed, “it was such an
innovation that many considered it radical and unworkable.” According to Zimmerman, “it was the last hope of private
enterprise. The alternative was socialization of the housing industry.” Id. (citing FHA, THE FHA STORY IN SUMMARY,
1934–1959 (1959)).
157 According to Louis Hyman, the FHA program “completely reversed…the conventional justification for government
intrusions.” FHA money was “not the dole” and “not taxpayer money.” Id.
158 HYMAN, supra note 26, at 71.
159 Id.
160 Id.
152
153
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been as banks significantly reduced down payment requirements, lengthened loan terms, and slashed
interest rates. 161 “In the transformed mortgage market, they could pay less in mortgage payments
than they were paying in rent. A borrower who moved from renting a small apartment in the city to
owning a large home in the suburbs was actually saving money. 162
The FHA developed discriminatory credit guidelines, which reflected the widespread racial
discrimination of the era. Government analysts decided that lending to Black borrowers was too
risky and thus coded Black neighborhoods as uncreditworthy. This turned out to be a self-fulfilling
prophesy. By not insuring home mortgages to Black communities, the FHA programs cut off the
credit supply to these families and blocked the only route to building middle class wealth and equity
available at the time. The lack of wealth thus led to higher cost credit, which cyclically led back to
lower wealth, a segregated and self-perpetuating economic system, which I’ve called “Jim Crow
Credit.” 163 These subsidies and loan guarantees allowed eligible borrowers (mostly restricted to white
men) to build wealth while paying less of their wages for housing costs. They built and
overdeveloped the country through suburbs through suburbanization and white flight and they led
to segregated communities, schools and credit markets.
The FHA is an example of a government credit program with the power to redesign the
entire credit landscape. By nature of these mortgages, many Americans built intergenerational wealth
and gained social capital and access to other low-cost credit and services that have continued to
enhance the lives of their progeny. While those left out of these wealth-building subsidies were
pushed into alternative and higher cost credit markets. In fact, many of the legal structures and
private market efforts aimed at financial inclusion and access to credit have these historically
redlined communities in mind. Black Americans are disproportionately unbanked and underbanked
and are more likely to have to resort to high interest credit products like payday loans. 164 Black
communities were also more likely to be sold subprime mortgages, contract sales, and other wealthstripping mortgage products when the underlying nature of the credit markets shifted. 165 These
predatory high cost subprime mortgages and payday loans were justified by the industry and the
regulators that allowed them through the rhetoric of financial inclusion and increased access to
credit. In other words, it was believed that the private market could fix disparities created by public
policy, but the gaps that led to financial exclusion were the result of government credit and banking
policies and not “natural market forces.” Even well-meaning financial inclusion programs, including
robust anti-redlining measures like the CRA, remain firmly rooted in neoliberal logic that centers the
private banking market in remedying the historic exclusion of Black communities. 166
The FHA and GSE enabled federal mortgage markets were not an added product that
provided credit to those outside the circle. It expanded, or created, a circle by changing the entire
credit market. The FHA did not simply “increase access to credit.” Rather, it redesigned the modern
mortgage credit market. Today, these programs are ongoing economic programs that are selfsustaining though they have changed in significant ways. They have become the background
See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER, 204–205, (1985); HYMAN, supra note 26, at 56–57 (2011).
See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 152.
163 Mehrsa Baradaran, Jim Crow Credit, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 101, 105 (2019).
164 See BARADARAN, supra note 67, at 14; See general FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED
AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 2-3 (2017).
165 BARADARAN, supra note 67, at 212-14.
166 Baradaran, supra note 161; KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL ESTATE
INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP (2019); JACKSON, supra note 159.
161
162
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economic engine that most Americans rely on to attend school or buy a home. The invisibility of
these ongoing programs and supports hide the true nature of the credit markets as a byproduct of
legal and regulatory design.
The point of cataloguing the public nature of credit and payments is to show that the
banking system at its root and branches is shaped by public policy, subsidized by public funds, and
built on a public monopoly. With this view of the mainstream banking system, we can turn our
attention back out to the periphery and propose a new way of articulating the nature of financial
inclusion and access to credit.
PART III
If public policy determines the nature and the shape of credit markets, what is the meaning
of financial inclusion? By focusing on the nature of credit at the center of the concentric circles of
inclusion and contrasting that credit with what lies outside, it becomes clear why the prevailing view
of financial inclusion is flawed. Who has access to credit and at what price is often a policy decision
or is a result of a former policy determination. Likewise, access to the payment system is also an
outcome of institutional design and policy. Yet in discussions about financial inclusion, the role of
public policy is often evaded. As described in Part I, the rhetoric around financial inclusion and the
programs and products proposed as remedies erase the role of the public provisioning of the
financial system. Each model of financial inclusion relies on private or charitable services apart from
the “normal” banking system. Financial inclusion is discussed as a separate and supplementary
project disconnected to the central machinery of finance. Access to credit is the provision of credit
that is more or different than what is provided in mainstream “markets.” Yet to speak of markets at
all is misleading. Lending is a profitable venture for those engaged in it and market competition
among the various banks and credit issuers, but the basic structure of the market is policy.
Therefore, financial inclusion, must be reconceptualized within a framework of policy-created credit
and monetary policy. Credit policies like the FHA programs or lending supports mentioned above
are different than monetary policy, but they are linked and inter-related in significant ways. This Part
will talk about the political economy of money and credit because decisions regarding monetary
policy determine credit availability and vice versa. Moreover, even at the basic level, money is a form
of credit and vice versa. There are distinctions, but for the purpose of the financial design proposed
in this Article, they are both a result of legal design. This Part thus aims to connect the
“democratization of credit” to democratic functions.
Any discussion of financial inclusion and access to credit that is detached from political
power and democratic governance is incomplete. Conversation about financial inclusion should not
be relegated to the fringes of finance; rather it should be discussed within the domain of
policymaking. Regardless of intent or even awareness, financial regulators are making decisions
about credit and financial inclusion whenever they pull on their various monetary policy tools. These
decisions affect the core of the economy and lead to the expansion or contraction of credit
availability, interest rates, investment opportunities, wages, and other prices. The connection is not
always direct and often monetary policy actions do not lead to desired or intended outcomes. The
economy is complicated and the role of individual policies to effect systemwide outcomes is weak
and indirect. Yet, there are tangible effects to monetary policy decisions. Today, credit policy and
monetary policy are not a regular part of democratic debate even though these policy decisions
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affect prices, the rate of unemployment, and the cost and availability of credit in fundamental
ways. 167 This was not always the case.
At certain moments in American history, decisions about the nature and quantity of money
and credit in the economy were viewed as a matter of fierce political and legal debate. 168 The debates
about money were key issues around which the parties coalesced. Gold vs. silver, specie vs. fiat
money, national currencies vs. state currencies were matters decided by the polity usually during
elections. Political factions defined their ideology based on monetary policy. They understood that
the type of money in circulation had effects on market prices, employment rates, credit availability,
and even inequality levels.
Progressives, Populists, and Access to Credit
The era of rising progressive politics between 1890s until the 1940s marked a time of
unprecedented economic growth and American power as well as a protracted debate about the
nature of democracy and capitalism. 169 Many of these progressive theories are embedded in the
today’s financial system, including the creation of the federal reserve, federal lending programs,
FDIC insurance, and fiat (or paper) money.
Central to the progressive and populist movement were issues of money and credit.
Progressives introduced public platforms advocating “access to credit” and looser monetary
standards as a matter of policy. 170 To these reformers, access to credit was not about the outer rungs
of system; they had in mind a complete re-writing of the financial code and the design of banking.
Some of these movement coalitions were even dubbed by the money standard they were advocating.
Groups called the “free silverites” and “the greenbackers” were part of the base of the progressive
party and were one-issue voters. It was amidst this era of upheaval and public debate that terms like
“access to credit” and the “democratization of credit” entered the political lexicon. 171
To progressive reformers, credit accessibility was a binary choice—gold or silver. Similarly,
credit was not a product that was distinct from the monetary and banking system, but a direct
outgrowth of it. If money was based on the gold standard, credit would be scarce. Gold was
essentially restrictive and only the wealthy would have access to this type of money. Silver was more
accessible. Paper money was even more flexible.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., About the Fed, https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/why-is-itimportant-to-separate-federal-reserve-monetary-policy-decisions-from-political-influence.htm, (last visited Jan. 31,
2020).
168 See, e.g., Ellen E. Meade, The FOMC: Preferences, Voting, and Consensus, 87 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 93, 93
(2005).
169 JOHN D. HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT: A HISTORY OF THE FARMER’S ALLIANCE AND THE PEOPLE’S PARTY (1931).
170 Daniel T. Rodgers, The Progressive Era to the New Era, 1900-1929, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. OF AMERICAN HIST.,
https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-now/progressive-era-new-era-1900-1929 (last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
171 Corpus Linguistic search of “Access to Credit” and “Democratization of Credit” from Brigham Young University
database (Feb. 18, 2019) (on file with author).
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The Progressive era money tradition pushed for an expansionary money system, a demand
rooted in largely unstated by revolutionary ideas about money, specifically the flexibility of money
forms, the connection between money and politics, and the distributional effects of monetary
standards . 172 Several crucial presidential elections featured monetary policy as a central issue of
debate. 173 The populist party platform of 1892 expressed the issue as follows: “
“We demand a national currency, safe, sound, and flexible, issued by the general
government only, a full legal tender for all debts, public and private, and that without
the use of banking corporations, a just, equitable, and efficient means of distribution
direct to the people….We demand free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold at
the present legal ratio of l6 to 1…We demand that the amount of circulating medium
be speedily increased to not less than $50 per capita….We believe that the money of
the country should be kept as much as possible in the hands of the people, and
hence we demand that all State and national revenues shall be limited to the
necessary expenses of the government, economically and honestly
administered….We demand that postal savings banks be established by the
government for the safe deposit of the earnings of the people and to facilitate
exchange.” 174
This, plus a provision on taxation, was the entire platform. Things came to a head in the
1896 Presidential election when William Jennings Bryant became the Democratic candidate after a
rousing polemic on behalf of the common man against the bankers. “You shall not crucify mankind
on a cross of gold,” he demanded on behalf of the small farmers he represented. 175 This was the first
time in American history that the Gold standard became a political lightening rod. This is a result of
an act of legislation called “The Crime Act of 1873,” that created a minor change in codification

MURRY N. ROTHBARD, A HISTORY OF MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE COLONIAL ERA TO
WORLD WAR II 183-234 (2002); See also, MICHAEL O'MALLEY, FACE VALUE: THE ENTWINED HISTORIES OF MONEY
AND RACE IN AMERICA (2012).
173 SCOTT J. HAMMOND ET AL., CAMPAIGNING FOR PRESIDENT IN AMERICA 1788-2016 563, 574-75, 585 (2016).
174 KIRK H. PORTER & DONALD B. JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1964 91 (1966).
175 SHANNON L. KENNY, GOLD: A CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 122 (2011).
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with large political effects. 176 Throughout American history, money could be backed by both gold
and silver depending on the price and availability of each—and the nation toggled between the two.
Officially, the United States began with a bimetallic money standard in which both gold and silver
were used to define the monetary unit, as recommended by Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton
in the first coinage act. 177 Silver was more readily available from 1792 to 1834 and thus was the
unofficial money standard. Silver was the cheaper metal and more convenient to mint and exchange.
From 1834 until 1862, Congress tipped the scales toward gold by changing the ratio. New gold
discoveries in the west also led to gold being the dominant standard during this era. 178After the brief
experiment with fiat currency was over, the Treasury went back to a gold standard in 1879 with two
important changes: “(1) the government now was an issuer of paper money redeemable on demand
and (2) the paper money was legal tender.” 179 Congress ended fiat currency by legislation, but
without debate, they chose only gold and not bitmetalism as was the custom.
One of Bryan’s chief political issue was money. Bryan explained, “We say in our platform
that we believe that the right to coin money and issue money is a function of government. We
believe it. We believe it is a part of sovereignty and can no more with safety be delegated to private
individuals than can the power to make penal statutes or levy laws for taxation.” 180 He linked his
platform, not erroneously, to Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson. “I stand with Jefferson rather
than with them,” referring to the class of bankers, “and tell them, as he did, that the issue of money
is a function of the government and that the banks should go out of the governing business.” 181
Despite his passion, Bryan lost the debate. Congress reaffirmed its commitment to gold by passing
the “Gold Standard Act” in 1900, which fixed the standard of value to gold for all forms of money
issued or coined by the United States, to refund the public debt, and all other purposes. 182
The choice between the gold standard, silver, bimetallism (gold and silver), or fiat currency
was a choice made by the legislature that affected how much credit would be available and ultimately
to whom. The choice to move from gold to silver expanded the circle of credit available and the
move from silver to fiat currency expanded it even more. 183 These expansions were not without cost.
An act revising and amending the laws relative to the mints, assay-offices, and coinage of the United States, 17 Stat.
424, February 1873. This is sometimes referred to as “The Crime of ‘73. See CRAIG K. ELWELL, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
GOLD STANDARD IN THE UNITED STATES 6 n.26 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41887.pdf.
177 Elwell, supra note 174, at 2.
178 Id. at 2-5.
179 Id. at 4 n.18.
180 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE ET AL., GREAT POLITICAL ISSUES AND LEADERS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1900 422 (1900).
181 JOLYON P. GIRARD ET AL., AMERICAN HISTORY THROUGH ITS GREATEST SPEECHES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 299 (2017).
182 Gold Standard Act 301 Stat. 45 (1900).
183 George Selgin, The Rise and Fall of the Gold Standard in the United States, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 729 (2013).
John Maynard Keynes addressed this type of contract absolutism: “There is a respectable and influential body of opinion
which… fulminates alike against devaluations and levies, on the ground that they infringe the untouchable sacredness of
contract…. Yet such persons, by overlooking one of the greatest of all social principles, namely the fundamental
distinction between the right of the individual to repudiate contract and the right of the State to control vested interest,
are the worst enemies of what they seek to preserve. For nothing can preserve the integrity of contract between
individuals except a discretionary authority in the State to revise what has become intolerable. The powers of
uninterrupted usury are great. If the accretions of vested interest were to grow without mitigation for many generations,
half the population would be no better than slaves to the other half…. The absolutists of contract… are the real parents
of revolution.”
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In fact, with each expansion, the currency was devalued. 184 This was the point. Increasing the
amount of money meant that those who held money would have less of it in proportion to the
whole. Changes in the monetary standard, like inflation today, affected property rights and contract
rights by diminishing the value of fortunes held or to be received. If money was seen as a contract or
property right by the holder of the money and enforced by the sovereign, many argued that a
legislative change in the basis of the currency was a breach of contract or a violation of a property
right. These contractual arguments were used against the legal tender acts as well as the bimetallism
proposals of the populists and progressives. 185
Backers of gold often rejected the popular demands for bimetallism by stating that the gold
standard was “natural” and “scientific.” 186 In actuality, the gold standard was a result of a legal
design. There was nothing inherently valuable or “money-like” to gold, but it became public policy
that gold would be the money standard. 187 The progressive era reformers were joined by several
other factions, including Wall Street bankers, in pushing for more flexible monetary forms and a
central bank in order to avoid constant financial panics and crises caused by limited gold supply. 188
The gold standard proved to be overly restrictive and unstable with many scholars blaming the
dogged insistence on gold for exacerbating the Great Depression. Along with passing many of the
progressive reforms, Franklin Roosevelt essentially ended the gold standard in 1933 without public
debate. 189
The crucial turn of the century debates about the monetary standard were a matter of public
democratic debate. The monetary standard would be decided by law or policy and would lead to
money expansion or contraction and would have significant effects on the availability of credit.
Small farmers would not have access to credit under the gold standard, but they would under
bimetallism. Holders of gold would lose the value of investments if the standard shifted to silver.
Inclusion and access to credit were linked to how much money was available in the economy. As
Christine Desan explains in her historic account about the creation of fiat money in the 1600s,
Making Money, decisions regarding the nature and availability of money are always legal and
political. 190 This approach, which she has called the Constitutional Approach of Money challenges
the prevailing story about money that describes money as a natural byproduct of the evolution of
trade from barter to gold coins to fiat money. 191 According to prevailing neoliberal theories of

Id. at 19.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ESSENTIAL KEYNES (Robert Skidelsky ed., 2016).
186 O'MALLEY, supra note 170, at 134-138.
187 Gold was not just the monetary standard in the United States, but across the world as well. This is likely due to the
Roman Empire’s decision to use gold coins as currency and then the Bank of England’s decision to peg their currency to
their supply of gold. For an excellent history of the gold standard, see CHRISTINE A. DESAN, MAKING MONEY (2014);
BILL MAURER, PAID: TALES OF DONGLES, CHECKS, AND OTHER MONEY STUFF (Bill Maurer & Lana Swartz, eds. 2017).
188 Raghuram G. Rajan & Rodney Ramcharan, Land and Credit: A Study Of The Political Economy Of Banking In The United
States In The Early 20th Century ((Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No.15083, 2009),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15083.
189 Elwell, supra note 174, at 9-11; Milton Friedman, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Silver, and China, 100 J. POL. ECON. 62 (1992).
190 See Desan, supra note 185, at 127-31 (describing the history of the monetary system in England and early America).
191 See id. at 113-18 (describing the constitutional approach to money); Julia Y. Lee, Money Norms, 49 LOYOLA CHI. L. J.
57, 62 (“Fiat money has no intrinsic value; it is ultimately a social construct whose value turns on beliefs, expectations,
and social relations between its users.”); Simon H. Rifkind, Money as a Device for Measuring Value, 26 COL. L. REV. 559
(1926) (observing that “money is the measuring device and the medium of expression for value.”); RICHARD H.
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money, money is a neutral medium of exchange. 192 Desan explains that historically, money forms
gained legitimacy and became currency when they were issued by the government, enforced by the
legal system, and redeemed by pubic treasuries for payment. “Rather than coming at money from
the outside,” Desan explains, “the constitutional approach comes at it from the inside.” 193
The crucial point is that “money has an internal design: societies produce it by structuring
claims of value in ways that make those claims commensurable, transferable, and available for
certain private as well as public uses.” 194 Those design decisions have market-shaping consequences
and more crucially for this project, policy decisions about money affect social inequality. Felix
Martin compares the conventional view of money as a “fulcrum of the scales of political
justice…just like the fulcrum on a physical pair of scales, it has to be fixed in place in order to be
accurate.” Yet history does not support this view of money. Rather, economic value has not been a
natural fact, but rather, determinations of value are socially created. Money is not a natural element
that needs to be excavated or discovered. It is a system of agreed-upon value that must be designed
to meet the needs of a particular society or economy. Money does not just measure value, but it
creates it. As Martin explains about the creation of new monetary regimes, “There is therefore
nothing intrinsically wrong with moving the fulcrum of the scales of justice, since their purpose is
not to achieve accuracy—a notion without meaning in the social world—but fairness and
prosperity.” In other words, when there are inequalities created by the monetary regime (such as was
created during the gold standard, it is legitimate and perhaps necessary “to move the fulcrum to
restore balance.” 195
The Creation of The Federal Reserve
The founding and establishment of the Federal Reserve was another pivotal policy that was
debated on terms of access to credit. 196 A crucial point of contention was whether to make the
Federal Reserve a public institution or a private one with progressives and populists arguing the
former and Wall Street bankers arguing the latter. These were political decisions and the various
groups of populists, progressive reformers, and Wall Street bankers understood them as such. 197 For
example, what types of liquidity support and to whom would the Federal Reserve be authorized to
support? 198 The types of assets the Federal Reserve would guarantee would also affect different
MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 57 (2015) (“Only in a crisis do citizens wonder
why they should exchange valuable goods and services for pieces of paper with no intrinsic value.”).
191 FELIX MARTIN, MONEY: THE UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY--FROM COINAGE TO CRYPTOCURRENCIES 264-65
(2015).
192 See Desan, supra note 185, at 112-13 (noting the modern equilibrium theory is built on the notion that money is
neutral).
193 See id. at 3.
194 Id.
195 MARTIN, supra note 189, 264-65 (2015).
196 Robert Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social Responsibility: Comprehending Corporate Wealth
Maximization and Distribution for Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Society, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1531, 1547 (2002); See also, ROGER
LOWENSTEIN, AMERICA’S BANK: THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2015).
197 Sarah Binder & Mark Spindel, Monetary Politics: Origins of the Federal Reserve, 27 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1, 3 (2013).
198 See generally JACOB HACKER AND PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE
RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010). “The purpose of the Federal Reserve Act,
which was established to provide more broadly distributed (democratic) access to business credit and to promote
economic growth consistent with a stable money supply in support of stable prices.”; see also Ashford, supra note 194, at
1547. For a discussion on public/private compromise, see Peter Conti-Brown, The Twelve Federal Reserve Banks: Governance
and Accountability in the 21st Century (Hutchins Ctr on Fiscal & Monetary Pol’y at Brookings, Working Paper No. 10, 2015)
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types of borrowers differently. 199 The legal definitions of asset that the Federal Reserve would
guarantee created a property right with a market value. The legal determination embedded in the
Fed’s mandate on this issue determined, according to Nadav Orian Peer, were about “what class of
borrowers [would] enjoy preferred access to credit?” 200 The institutional law-made architecture “was
part of an agenda of replacing corporate concentration with competition and decentralization,” Peer
explains. “They were not only attempts at preventing panics but a program to redistribute credit
away from the corporate capital market and into smaller scale commercial activity.” 201
In other words, the legal design of the Federal Reserve would determine who had “access to
credit.” In fact, that moment of debate is when the term entered the political lexicon. A search of all
public documents in the largest database made recently available through the Corpus Linguistics
project shows that the term “access to credit” was used only 11 times between 1800 to 1900. By
1920, it was used 27 times and entered common usage by 1970. I researched every use of the term
before 1900 and found that every instance of usage refereed to foreign banks. In the American
context, “access to credit” was first used in the debates about the federal reserve and increased
thereafter. 202
The Federal Reserve’s decision in 2008 to use its emergency powers to bail out the banks
rather than underwater homeowners also had significant distributional consequences. 203 Then, the
Federal Reserve’s unprecedented monetary infusions through programs like QE created
distributional effects that are yet to be fully accounted for and understood. 204 These emergency

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PCB_WorkingPaper10_June24_Final.pdf; Binder &
Spindel, supra note 195 (“Two key disputes emerged as the House and Senate worked on currency bills in 1913. First
how should Congress balance the demands by eastern, primarily Republican, bankers for centralized authority against
the demands by Populists and Democratic farmers for decentralized control of the flow of credit?”); ALAN M.
MELTZER, 1 A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 3 (2003) (quotation from President Woodrow Wilson) (“ . . . a
currency which comes into existence in response to the call of every man who can show a going business and a concrete
basis for extending credit to him, however obscure or prominent he may be . . .”).
199 Michael D. Bordo & William Roberds, The Promise and Performance of the Federal Reserve as Lender of Last Resort 1914-1933
59 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No.16763, 2011).
200 Nadav Orian Peer, Negotiating the Lender-of-Last-Resort: The 1913 Fed Act as a Debate Over Credit Distribution, 15 N.Y.U. J.
L. & BUS. (2019).
201 Id.
202 “…[T]he purpose of the Federal Reserve Act, which was established to provide more broadly distributed
(democratic) access to business credit and to promote economic growth consistent with a stable money supply in
support of stable prices. See Robert Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social Responsibility:
Comprehending Corporate Wealth Maximization and Distribution for Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Society, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1531,
1547 (2002). “Two key disputes emerged as the House and Senate worked on currency bills in 1913. First how should
Congress balance the demands by eastern, primarily Republican, bankers for centralized authority against the demands
by Populists and Democratic farmers for decentralized control of the flow of credit?” See Sarah A. Binder & Mark
Spindel, Monetary Politics: Origins of the Federal Reserve, 27 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 1, 3 (2013); ”a currency which comes
into existence in response to the call of every man who can show a going business and a concrete basis for extending
credit to him, however obscure or prominent he may be…” See also ALLAN H. MELTZER, 1 A HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE 3 (2003)
203 See Konczal & Mason, supra note 141, at 46. PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED
BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT, at 28 (2010) (noting a severe contraction in private liquidity during the financial
crisis and the distributional consequences of federal liquidity programs).
204 For Legal academy treatment of money, see DESAN, supra note 185; RICKS, supra note 143; Deborah D’Souza, Mondern
Monetary Theory, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/modern-monetary-theory-mmt-4588060, (last visited
Feb. 4, 2019); McLeay et al., supra note 144.
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credit programs and the monetary policy that followed were all a result of policymaking, legal
structure, and institutional design.
The Federal Reserve’s role in the payments system was clearer than its evolving role in
monetary policy. Congress instructed the Fed in the 1913 Federal Reserve Act to “increase the
integrity, efficiency and equity of US payments.” It was structured as a public institution by legal
design. According to its own charter, “the Federal Reserve was established to serve the public
interest.” 205 The Federal Reserve has interpreted its role in the payments system as a mandate “to
bring to payments markets an overall concern for safety and soundness, promotion of operating
efficiency, and equitable access.” The Fed states that “considerations relating to integrity, efficiency,
and access to the payments system will remain at the core of the Federal Reserve’s role and
responsibilities regarding the operation of the payments system.” The Fed also recognizes the need
to adapt its mandate to changing conditions, stating, “given the size, speed, and interdependencies of
payments, this mission is, and will likely continue to be, even more important than it was when the
Federal Reserve was established in 1913.” 206
Congress did not mandate the Federal Reserve to provide an account for every individual,
but rather to ensure “equitable” access. Since its inception, the Federal Reserve has chosen to use
banks as intermediaries for credit allocation and for access to the payments system. The banks
operate as intermediaries between the central bank’s credit and payments system and the broader
economy, but banks do not have an obligation to provide every customer with an account or with
access to credit. At the time the Federal Reserve was chartered, access to the payments system was
not crucial to participation in the economy. So long as a merchant could use cash or bills, she could
participate in commerce. Today, the majority of transactions have been digitized. Paying bills, being
paid for work, purchasing food or supplies—all of these financial transactions are conducted using a
credit or debit card, an online platform, a mobile app or a check. These all require access to the
centralized payments system. As noted above, those without bank accounts pay a fee to make all of
these transactions because the Federal Reserve does not allow individuals access to the payments
system without a bank account. To the extent that this system is exclusionary, the Federal Reserve
can and should meet its legal mandate by opening its payments system to individuals. 207 The next
section will explain how this can be done.
Financial Redesign
The current understanding of financial inclusion and access to credit is flawed and
incomplete because it focuses on access, inclusion, and gap filling without describing the essential
nature of money and credit. Defining “access” has everything to do with defining “credit.” The
prevailing neoliberal view of credit markets, especially with regards to consumer credit markets,
conceives of credit as a natural and finite product of the market. Its cost and availability is

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., About the Fed, https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/why-is-itimportant-to-separate-federal-reserve-monetary-policy-decisions-from-political-influence.htm, (last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
206 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., POLICIES: THE FEDERAL RESERVE IN THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM
(1990), https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/pfs_frpaysys.htm.
207 See id.; see also CAROL COYE BENSON ET AL., PAYMENTS SYSTEMS IN THE U.S. (3rd ed. 2010).
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determined by the lender. 208 The borrower’s “creditworthiness” is the essential determinative factor
in whether a credit product is available and how much it costs. 209
The prevailing model of finance hides the essential nature of credit—its availability and cost
on a systemic level. At the micro level where a borrower seeks a loan from a lender, this basic
description is accurate. An individual lender has a limited quantity of money. If she decides to lend it
for a profit, she must calculate the odds of getting the money back. She will determine whether to
lend, how much to lend, and at what cost depending on the risks she faces of losing her money. If
the risk is high, she will require higher interest to compensate her. If the risk is too high, she will not
lend. This model of credit availability and cost when it comes to most non-bank lenders. A payday
lender, a pawn shop, credit card companies, and other consumer lenders are taking risks with their
own funds or their investors’ funds when they lend. However, the modern credit markets do not
work this way. As demonstrated in Part II, banks create money when they lend. 210 The money they
are lending does not have to come from their pocketbook or their investors’ accounts. 211 The money
is created through the loan or on a macro-level, the available money is created by monetary policy
and public spending. 212
Availability of and access to credit are directly linked to federal underwriting policy and the
federal reserve’s monetary policy. 213 The determination of creditworthiness and risk of repayment is
usually being made through uniform standards and underwriting requirements without regard to the
characteristics of individual borrowers. 214 The federal government determines who qualifies for a
mortgage—at least a mortgage that the GSE’s will purchase or insure. 215 The determination of
creditworthiness—the size of the credit circle and who can fit inside—is made by policymakers. 216
Those who do not fit the requirements are on the outside of the circle. This was most starkly
demonstrated through the FHA redlining program, which still determines the “creditworthiness” of
the initially excluded households and communities.
Thus, the job of policymakers is to create a credit and monetary system that achieves justice
and shared prosperity. The first step is a rejection of the current narrative about financial inclusion
and “access to credit” that views lack of access as market failure that can be remedied through
subsidies or market innovation. As wealth and income gaps have increased, so too have the products
and promises from Silicon Valley and Wall Street that a new app, cryptocurrency, or financial
See Steven L. Schwarz, The Financial Crisis and Credit Unavailability: Cause or Effect?, 72 BUS. LAW. 409, 412 (2017)
(noting that credit availability depends on financial markets and banks).
209 See Baradaran, supra note 123, at 493-94 (noting that banks do not lend to the poor because of higher credit risks and
narrower profit margins).
210 See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO
DEMOCRACY, at 13 (2015) (“By lending, banks actually create money. To repeat, commercial banks create money by
making new loans. For example, when a bank makes a mortgage loan, it does not just give someone $100,000 in cash to
go purchase a house. Instead, it creates a credit, a deposit, in the borrower’s bank account for the size of the
mortgage.”).
211 Id.
212 See McLeay et. al., supra note 144 (explaining how the majority of money in the economy is created by commercial
banks making loans).
213 FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, FHFA’S OVERSIGHT OF FANNIE MAE’S SINGLE-FAMILY UNDERWRITING
STANDARDS 2-3 (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/AUD-2012-003_0.pdf.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
208

40
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3607461

product will lead to financial inclusion. These communities do not need better blockchain design or
mobile apps—they need simple access to a checking account and a debit card. 217
Instead of financial inclusion, consumer advocates and policymakers should focus on
financial redesign. Instead of looking to products, subsidies or innovations to include consumers,
policymakers can design a more equitable and expansionary financial system. In both the realm of
payments and credit, public policies are responsible for exclusion and can be changed to enable
expansion. For example, the Fed’s monetary policy could bypass banks as an intermediary and
directly stimulate the public through investments in education, healthcare, infrastructure, and
housing. 218 Credit programs with Treasury guarantees have already provided many people with the
means to get career training, go to college, or buy a home, as government programs have done in the
past. 219 They can be used to promote policy goals, such as closing the racial wealth gap or reducing
inequality in the future.
We must recognize that many aspects of the financial system, including certain credit
programs, payments, and access to safe deposits are essential services that must be provided for all.
When confronting the power of banking trusts and monopoly power over credit, Justice Louis
Brandeis proposed that certain industries to be especially suited for a public utility nature. Banking
or railroads, for example, were considered service essential to full participation in commerce. In
these cases, Brandeis offered an alternative to create a public utility. Such a utility could either
compete with the market or offer an alternative. Brandeis believed banking to be among the
industries that might be considered a public utility because, as he explained “that deposit banking
should be recognized as one of the businesses ‘affected with a public interest.’” 220 This was because
banks gained their market power and their profits through the use of “other people’s money.”
In order to meaningfully participate in the economy, the excluded, unbanked, and
communities living in banking deserts need access to the safe and subsidized payments system
operated by the Fed. Financial redesign requires that the payments system operated by the Federal
Reserve be opened to all. The central bank payments system already resembles a public utility, but it
is currently only a public service open to banks who operate as an intermediary. Opening the
payments system to the unbanked and underbanked would not cause any disruptions to the financial
market, but would be a boon to LMI families who are currently paying to use a public resource. 221
In previous work, I have suggested a public option through postal banking. 222 Postal banks would
offer a free savings and checking account that would enable the unbanked and underbanked to
engage in simple financial transactions through the public payments system instead of high cost nonSee Kevin Foster et al., The 2008 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice, FED. RES. BANK OF BOSTON (2009),
http://www.bos.frb. org/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0910.htm.
218 Konczal and Mason make just such a proposal. See generally Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, White Paper: A
National Investment Authority (Cornell Legal R. Paper No. 18-10, 2018); See also BARADARAN, supra note 208.
219 Nadav Orian Peer, Public Purpose Finance (2019) (draft paper on file with author).
217
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222 See BARADARAN, supra note 208, at 190-91; Baradaran, supra note 123; Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking,
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bank options like check-cashing or pre-paid debit cards. 223 Such an option would put approximately
$89 Billion per year back into the pockets—or bank accounts—of the unbanked. 224 Other
researchers have built on the postal banking suggestion and improved on its basic structure. 225 Ricks,
Crawford and Menand have proposed a Fed Accounts system, which would be an individual
account offered by the Federal Reserve by way of the post office to all individuals. 226
On the credit side, the Federal Reserve could operate as a public bank. A public bank need
not be linked to the Federal Reserve, but given the history, capacity and structure of the Federal
Reserve, it is likely the institution best suited for such an endeavor. Public banking could remove
banks as an intermediary in credit markets and offer direct services, including credit and
transactional services directly. Policymakers already make decisions that affect the price of credit and
the types of borrowers who are given subsidized loans. The federal government has decided to
provide credit to the middle class for mortgages and student loans. 227 And indeed, these programs
have been ongoing since the establishment of the Federal home loan, farm loan, and student loan
programs. 228 Federal Reserve monetary policy has also provided unprecedented funds to banks
through payments on reserves and QE and other programs. 229 The Fed has done so under their legal
mandate to boost the economy. 230 Yet the banks have deferred to the banks to make lending
decisions. 231 Those who have fallen on the outside of the circle must therefore rely on the market for
their credit needs. These credit markets will provide access to credit and will price the credit
according to risk. 232 A public bank can boost the economy directly by offering direct loans and direct
accounts.
Public banking can take many forms. Like the public state bank of North Dakota, a Federal
Public bank can finance large or targeted infrastructure projects. It can do so by offering public
CAMPAIGN FOR POSTAL BANKING, POSTAL BANKING: KNOW THE FACTS,
http://www.campaignforpostalbanking.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/KnowtheFacts.pdf (last visited Feb. 28,
2019).
224 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE FOR THE UNDERSERVED 2 (2014),
https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2015/rarc-wp-14-007_0.pdf.
225 See, e.g., David Dayen, The Post Office Should Just Become a Bank, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 28, 2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/116374/postal-service-banking-how-usps-can-save-itself-and-help-poor; Randall K.
Johnson, How the United States Postal Service (USPS) Could Encourage More Local Economic Development, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
593 (2017).
226 See MORGAN RICKS, JOHN CRAWFORD & LEV MENAND, CENTRAL BANKING FOR ALL: A PUBLIC OPTION FOR BANK
ACCOUNTS 1 (2018), https://greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FedAccountsGDI.pdf.
227 Rachel Fishman, The Wealth Gap PLUS Debt, NEW AMERICA (May 2018),
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228 See, e.g., BARADARAN, supra note 162, 67(“After creating the Federal Reserve, President Wilson and the 64th Congress
passed the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 for the express purpose of increasing credit to rural family farmers . . . . The
bill reduced interest rates on farm loans across the South and made credit much more accessible. This bill was the first
federal government loan program, and thanks to southern senators, it left black farmers out. The legislators created
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significant discretion given to local bureaucrats in lending, which effectively meant that blacks would not be given
loans.”).
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bonds or using its flexible monetary policy mandate. For example, in my proposal for a Twenty First
Century Homestead Act, I have suggested that federal reserve financing can help close the racial
wealth gap by purchasing abandoned and blighted properties in formerly redlined cities. 233 Other
target projects might include roads, hospitals, rehabilitation facilities, public housing, and
environmental cleanup projects.
These projects can be funded with a combination of Federal Reserve financing and Treasury
guarantees. These investments can be structured much like other government credit programs that
make returns sufficient enough to make the program profitable such that the fund can continue to
invest in other sectors. Many such programs already exist. Infrastructure investment funds can issue
investment shares through a securitized bond, which will be structured as a fixed rate, and variable
terms of between 5 to 20 years open to all investors. The bond can be guaranteed by the US
Treasury and maintain a Triple A rating. These investment funds can be structured much like the
Export-Import Bank and other New Deal Credit programs that became self-sustaining and even
profitable. After a decade of initial funding through Congressional appropriation, the Import-Export
Bank and other credit programs have been self-sustaining, operating based on their own revenues.
These bonds will be guaranteed by the Treasury. These guarantees lower the risk of investment,
attracting much more private capital. 234
The Federal Reserve can use a variety of methods modeled after existing stimulus programs.
Over the past decade, the Federal Reserve has used its monetary policy tools and authority to boost
economic activity. These programs, which included asset purchases, emergency loans, interest rate
payments on bank reserves, and other unconventional and creative programs, have succeeded in
their goals of economic recovery. However, while average real estate prices and stock market gains
have recovered, the recovery has not been spread evenly. Specifically, the racial wealth gap and
regional disparities have grown over the past decade. One reason for this inequality is that the Fed’s
interventions have gone through banks as an intermediary. In order the spur development, lending
and investment, the Federal Reserve should bypass the middlemen and fund the development
directly.
The Federal Reserve can also use its 13(3) powers to extend emergency loans to
municipalities facing acute financial pressure. When a city, state or municipality is in a state of crisis,
it does not get the same treatment from the Federal Reserve as did the failing banks—and even nonbanks like AIG. “It is hard to see why the failure of AIG or Bear Stearns was not acceptable, but the
failure of financially-constrained governments to deliver basic public services to millions of
Americans is,” asks economist Mike Konczal. 235 The Federal Reserve has the tools to rescue cities in
crisis, alleviate the toll of financial exclusion, mortgage foreclosures, and spur economic
revitalization where needed by buying public debt. As one economist remarked, “Fed money is not
exactly ‘free,’ but it has this great virtue for government: it doesn’t cost the taxpayers anything. Fed
expenditures do not show up in the federal budget, nor do they add anything to the national

233 Mehrsa Baradaran, A Homestead Act For The 21st Century, THE GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE, 18-27 (2019)
https://greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Homestead-Act-050719.pdf.
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debt.” 236 Konczal and Mason have suggested that the Fed can use its large portfolio of asset
purchases acquired through their QE investments to buy student debt. This intervention would
likely do more and do it more directly that investing in bank-held Mortgage Backed Securities that
may or may not eventually lead banks to lend more.
For longer-term projects, the Fed establish a programs to purchase bonds to fund student
debt relief, closing the racial wealth gap, dealing with the opioid crisis, or targeting environmental
recovery. These can be modeled after its ongoing monetary policy actions. Providing the funds
directly is thus a much more efficient way to meet the Fed’s goal of stimulating the economy. Two
recent examples of Federal Reserve stimulus programs are the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility (TALF), 237which involved the purchase of $50 billion in securities and QE, the Fed’s
purchase of public debt totaling around $4.5 trillion. 238Another example of monetary policy is
Interest On Excess Reserves (“IOER”), discussed above. 239 Each dollar held on reserve is a dollar
not lent for real estate, infrastructure, or business operations in the American economy. 240
Such public financing through the Federal Reserve and Treasury programs are
unconventional and will likely face political opposition. There is legal authority for Federal Reserve
monetary policy, but the nature of this plan would be unprecedented. The Federal Reserve has used
its monetary policy mandate to stimulate the economy in unprecedented ways, but those actions
occurred in the aftermath of a recession. Though these cities are suffering more dire recession
conditions than were present during the financial crisis, the cause of the slump was not an
emergency, but a slow decline. Moreover, these public finance programs differ from the Federal
Reserve’s past conduct because they require investment in public municipal funds or public banks
whereas the prior programs have been conducted through private banks. Historically, the Federal
Reserve’s role as “lender of last resort” was to operate through the banks and not directly with the
economy. This plan would diverge from that historical norm. Legally, these actions can be justified
See William Greider, Unusual and Exigent: How the Fed Can Jump-start the Real Economy, LEVY ECON. NOTES ARCHIVE
13-08 (2013), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/pn_13_8.pdf.
237 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/talf.htm. (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
238 See Konzcal & Mason, supra note 141. QE generated around $700 billion in profits for the Federal Reserve.; BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2019); Sindrew, supra note
141.
239 Due to the massive amounts of money created by QE, bank reserves swelled to over $1.7 trillion as of October
2018. This overage is called excess reserves and even though it was created by the federal reserve, banks earn interest on
these reserves. These reserves comprise a substantial portion of the nation’s monetary base. The Federal Reserve is using
this payment, called an “administered rate” as its primary monetary policy tool post QE. See FED. RES. BANK OF ST.
LOUIS, supra note 138. Banks are required to hold roughly 10% of their deposits in reserves at the central bank. The
required reserves on just customer deposits would equal roughly $189 billion. See Todd, supra note 138 (Put another way,
before August 2007, the Fed’s reserve account was 5.1% of the monetary base, and in mid-2013, the reserve accounts
240 Economists worried about such a large buildup of funds reserve have suggested that it is time for the Federal Reserve
to begin selling government securities in order to withdraw some money from the reserve balance. Former Fed officials
and economists have suggested using these funds to invest in the existing mortgage and student loan markets. Though
student and mortgage debt investments would be a boon to the economy and the middle class and both programs are
vastly more egalitarian than providing subsidies to banks, mortgage and student loan borrowers are more likely to be
members of the middle and upper class. Drawing down almost $200 billion in reserves by investing in the Homestead
Act is much more likely to make a dent in the great divergence of wealth. See generally Todd, supra note 138. Todd
suggests that the Federal Reserve sell about $180 billion in mortgage-backed securities or longer maturity Treasury
securities per year in order to prevent future inflation. Id. 15-16.
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given the Federal Reserve’s original legislation and if necessary, new authorizing legislation can be
written, but these actions will likely face political backlash due to recent public distrust of the
Federal Reserve and lobbying pressure. However, Federal Reserve spending is not subject to
Congressional appropriations and thus these investments can be shielded from the partisanship,
pork barrel spending, and industry lobbying that infect Congressional action.
Furthermore, the Federal Reserve’s participation is justified within its dual mandate as
specified by Congress and authorized under the law. The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee is authorized to “maintain long run growth
of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to
increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and
moderate long-term interest rates.” The Federal Reserve is also authorized, according to section
14(b) of the Act to buy and sell bonds issued by municipalities, states, or other instruments backed
by the Treasury. 241 Moreover, Section 13(3) allows the Federal Reserve to lend at a discount in an
emergency. 242 This is the authority the Federal Reserve relied on for its extraordinary bailout
provisions during starting in 2008. Through longer term lending at a fixed rate, the Fed can tailor
credit facilities to support public financing programs according to each communities’ residential and
economic development needs. Due in part to the Fed’s credibility and market stabilizing presence,
establishing community development credit facilities could result in benefits that greatly exceed the
actual volume of loans extended by the federal government to new homeowners. 243
241 See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §355 (1913). Purchase and sale of obligations of United States, States, counties,
etc.
1. To buy and sell, at home or abroad, bonds and notes of the United States, bonds issued under the provisions of
subsection (c) of section 4 of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, as amended, and having maturities from date of
purchase of no exceeding six months, and bills, notes, revenue bonds, and warrants with a maturity from date of
purchase of not exceeding six months, issued in anticipation of the collection of taxes or in anticipation of the receipt of
assured revenues by any State, county, district, political subdivision, or municipality in the continental United States,
including irrigation, drainage and reclamation districts, and obligations of, or fully guaranteed as to principal and interest
by, a foreign government or agency thereof, such purchases to be made in accordance with rules and regulations
prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
chapter, any bonds, notes, or other obligations which are direct obligations of the United States or which are fully
guaranteed by the United States as to the principal and interest may be bought and sold without regard to maturities but
only in the open market.
2. To buy and sell in the open market, under the direction and regulations of the Federal Open Market Committee, any
obligation which is a direct obligation of, or fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, any agency of the United
States.

See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §343 (1913). 3. Discounts for individuals, partnerships, and corporations: In
unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of
not less than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may
determine, at rates established in accordance with the provisions of section 14, subdivision (d), of this Act, to discount
for any participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such
notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve
bank: Provided, That before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange, the Federal reserve bank shall obtain
evidence that such participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility is unable to secure adequate credit
accommodations from other banking institutions. All such discounts for any participant in any program or facility with
broad-based eligibility shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations as the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System may prescribe.
243 One obstacle is that the Fed is currently only authorized to purchase state and local government debt with a maturity
date of less than six months. This law should be changed to enable the Fed to purchase long term debt as part of a land
trust owned by the Fed, state, and city governments collectively. See Konzcal & Mason, supra note 144.
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These are by no means an exhaustive list of financial redesign possibilities, which is not the
aim of this article. Rather, the above programs are examples of what might be possible through
creative financial redesign with a focus on equality and financial inclusion. The current model
assumes that entrepreneurs or new products can remedy financial exclusion, but financial exclusion
is a result of policy decisions that have centered bank credit as a principle means of access. Financial
redesign can change the assumptions on which the current system relies. Like moving from gold to
silver, a change in the legal foundations of credit and financial policy and create a much more
egalitarian economy than our current system.

CONCLUSION
This article analyzes the modern rhetoric of financial inclusion and access to credit and
explains that they are based on a flawed vantage of credit markets. Financial inclusion undertakings
take several disparate forms, such as subsidies, products, and anti-discrimination legislation, each of
these rests on an assumption that credit markets are a fixed market and that the role of financial
inclusion and access to credit efforts is to meet the needs of those outside the market. In fact, the
nature of credit markets, including their availability, is a result of public policy and monetary
decisions. In both aspects of financial services, payments and credit, the federal government creates
the market. Those who have access to banking and credit are usually the current or past beneficiaries
of public credit programs and publicly provided bank accounts. This article draws attention to the
legal infrastructure of financial markets and connects the discourse of financial inclusion to the
policy underpinnings of the finance that determined the nature of credit availability. The design of
money and credit markets have distributional consequences, which was a central insight of
progressive reforms largely ignored by modern financial inclusion advocacy. Law and policy were
embedded in the structure of the Federal Reserve, in the New Deal-era credit programs, and in the
laws governing banks. These laws and policies were often a compromise between progressive
reformers advocating greater access to credit against the interests protecting money holdings that
stood to lose from the changes. The stakes were high—the legal choices determined whether the
poor and the excluded would remain so or be given access to wealth-building credit to pole-vault
into the middle class. The latter ended up being the case for most but not all. Regardless of the
outcomes, the contours of the debate were mutually understood: that credit, money, and banking
policy was a decision to be made through the democracy. This is the theory that has been obscured
over time and that this article attempts to revive. Adopting a theory of financial redesign as opposed
to the current model of financial inclusion has significant normative implications and can lead to a
more egalitarian credit and financial system.
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